

POLITICAL AND MEDIA DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF PUBLIC OPINION

Migrant children and communities in a transforming Europe



The project Migrant Children and Communities in a Transforming Europe (MiCreate) aims to stimulate inclusion of diverse groups of migrant children by adopting child-centered approach to migrant children integration on educational and policy level.

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Migrant Children and Communities in a Transforming Europe

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AUSTRIA

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'Migration', 'integration' and 'FIFA World Cup' were the most common themes addressed in media coverage in Austria in 2018. Between January and November 2018, the topic of 'migration/asylum' was addressed in around 27.000 and 'integration' in 9.000 articles.¹ On one hand, this ranking speaks to the growing public interest in the topic against the background of the most recent wave of migration to Europe. Similarly, in 2015, when over a million migrants reached Europe, 59.326 articles had addressed 'wave of refugees/asylum debate', ranking first among all topics. On the other hand, rather than a direct causal link between growing numbers of migrants arriving in Europe and growing public interest in the topic, one should consider that a set of public and private actors actively arouse and sustain public interest in the topic to pursue certain (common, different, contradictory) political agendas. This is evident in the fact that, despite the common metaphors of 'wave of migration' or 'influx of refugees', four out of five refugees live in the countries neighboring their countries of origin (UNHCR, 2018). In 2016, most of the 3.2 million forcibly displaced

¹ Medienanalyse: Migrationsdiskursdominierte 2018 erneut die österreichische Berichterstattung. https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20181217_OTS0025/medienanalyse-migrationsdiskursdominierte-2018-erneut-die-oesterreichische-berichterstattung-anhang Accessed on 29.09.2019.

people found shelter in low- or middle-income countries.² These figures do not justify the political turmoil around the issue of migration and asylum in Europe.

Existing research demonstrates that, starting from the 1970s, migration has undergone a process of 'securitization' (Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005) that marks a discursive and institutional shift from labor and social policy to security policy in the political treatment and institutional regulation of migration. Using secondary discourse analysis, in the following we document the discursive shifts and current discursive landscape pertaining to migration and integration in Austria.

Based on these theoretical considerations, in this report, we answer the following questions: How are migration, migrants, refugees and integration constructed in public discourse? How are migrants represented in these discourses and which public attitudes towards migrant accompany these representations? For our analysis, we conduct a literature review based on existing recent research on migration and integration in German and English. While doing so, we pay attention to media coverage of migration and integration as well to the broader political debate. In the liberal imagination, the privatization and expansion of media is believed to contribute to democratic consolidation measured against the shrinking state control and a blossoming civil society, including businesses. The media is even called the 'fourth pillar of democracy' that operates in public interest by providing reliable information, ensuring transparency and accountability, controlling the political elite, and facilitating lively public debate. We counter these normative assumptions with a critical political science perspective that understands media discourses as a site of political contestation over resources, eligibility and recognition. Rather than assigning media a meta-role as above the state and politics, we understand it as embedded in and reflective of the broader social relations and political debates.

1. Main debates on migration in the last five years

Migration is by far not peculiar to our species or to our time. Yet, to understand modern migration in our globalized world, we need to *de-naturalize* and historicize the transnational movement of people. A postcolonial perspective on migration takes the global North-South cleavage as a starting point and considers the persistence of imperial structures of exploitation embedded in (neo-)colonial division of labor across the globe as a main indicator for current migration movements. As such, migration is structural rather than accidental or exogenous to industrial societies as it is tied to social inequalities constructed in the wake of colonization and, later, decolonization.

Discourses on migration entail assumptions on the causes and consequences of migration. In other words, they are attempts to make sense of migration as well as question and/or legitimize the material conditions of and institutional responses to migration. All discourses construct knowledge and subjects. "ways of constituting knowledge, together

² Poorer countries host most of the forcibly displaced, report shows. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2017/2/58b001ab4/poorer-countries-host-forcibly-displaced-report-shows.html> Accessed on 29.09.2019.

with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and the relations between them” (Pitsoe & Letseka, 2013, p. 24). More than ways of thinking, discourses are social practice for they construct truths, subjects and social (power) relations. Hegemonic discourses comprise and enforce knowledge and assumptions that privilege the interests of the dominant classes but are by no means uncontested. They are constantly challenged by counter-hegemonic discourses. It is in this field of tension that migration is negotiated in public discourses.

Existing research confirms that contemporary public debate in Europe and Austria evolve around two intimately related discourses, namely security and crisis (Bigo, 2002; Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002; Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005; Kluknavská, Bernhard, & Boomgaarden, 2019; Krzyżanowski, Triandafyllidou, & Wodak, 2018; Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018; Scheibelhofer, 2012). Whereas the securitization of migration has been ongoing since the 1990s, more recently, the urgency of issues related to migration and integration have been upgraded to a state of a ‘crisis’.

1.1 Security/securitization: Background and current trends

The European Union has experienced a politically manufactured, technocratic spillover because it started out as a contribution to peace in Europe, evolved into an internal market project and later developed into an internal security project (Huysmans, 2000). The abolishment of internal border control that privileges EU citizens and disadvantages third-country nationals contributes to delegitimizing migration into the EU and the policy framework supports welfare chauvinism and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor (ibid., p. 753). Migration is securitized through its social construction as “a danger to the public order, cultural identity, and domestic and labor market stability” (ibid., p. 752).

This has not always been the case. In the 1950s and 1960s, industrialized countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands recruited migrants to meet the domestic demand for a cheap and flexible labor force (ibid., p. 753). A milestone in the restrictive regulation of migration was the Council Regulation 1612/68 from 1968 on the freedom of movement of workers within the Community that laid the foundations of ‘fortress Europe’ and constructed the free movement of persons in the internal market as a prerogative for EU citizens (ibid., p. 754). The labor force deficit in the 1950s forced Austria to conclude a number of bilateral agreements to bring in workforce from abroad. In 1961, the Raab-Olah Agreement was signed between the social partners, i.e. *Wirtschaftskammer Österreich* (Austrian Economic Chamber, WKÖ) and *Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund* (Austrian Trade Union Federation, ÖGB) to set the legal framework and conditions for recruiting foreign workers called *Gastarbeiter*, ‘guest worker’, a term that implied temporariness (the ‘rotation’ principle). In 1961, a bilateral recruitment agreement was signed between Austria and Spain (which failed to attract a large number of workers from Spain due to low wages), in 1963 between Austria and Turkey and in 1967 between Austria and Yugoslavia. The number of *Gastarbeiter* increased from 21.000 to 227.000 between 1963 and 1973. In contrast to the

general expectation, most foreign workers settled permanently in Austria (Hahn & Stöger, 2014).

The international economic crises of 1974-1976 put an end to the recruitment of foreign workers and the foreigner's employment law (*Ausländerbeschäftigungsgesetz*) of 1975 envisioned stricter control of foreign labor by "limiting the duration of employment permits to a year, giving priority to Austrian workers for jobs, and stipulating that lay-offs should apply to foreign workers first" (Zahn, 2017, p. 123). However, due to political upheavals in Europe, increasing demand for labor and family unifications, the number of foreigners still doubled between 1987 and 1994, reaching 713.000 persons (Perchinig, 2010). Throughout the 1990s, social partners' influence on labor migration declined as migration policy moved from the Department of Labor to the Ministry of the Interior. In 1995, a quota system that restricted the share of foreign workers in the Austrian labor market to 10 percent and later (1996) to eight percent (*Bundeshöchstzahl*) replaced the rotation principle.

Concurrent to these developments, the composition and political profile of the parliament underwent significant changes in the late 1980s. Jörg Haider overtook the party leadership (1986-2000) of the right-wing FPÖ and *Grüne Alternative* (Green Alternative) entered the parliament for the first time. Neither of the parties belonged to the elite cartel of social partnership and needed to address a new political topic to distinguish themselves from the major parties, social democratic SPÖ and Christian democratic ÖVP (ibid.). Unlike the social partners who handled migration without public engagement as a labor market issue, the Greens reframed it as a human rights issue whereas FPÖ used it for nationalist mobilization (ibid.). In 1992, FPÖ leader Jörg Haider initiated a (unsuccessful) popular petition/referendum (*Volksbegehren*) called "Austria first" (*Österreich zuerst*) giving an early signal that FPÖ will frame the issue of migration in conjunction with national security and public order in the following decades.

Parallel to the overall rise of the number of migrants throughout the 1990s, the number of migrant pupils at Austrian schools increased too and integration at schools started being addressed as a social issue. Non-German first languages spoken by students, poor or insufficient levels of German among bilingual migrant children and their religion, especially Islam, started being pointed out as evidence for the formation of a 'parallel society' and failed integration, believed to pose a threat to 'Austrian values'.

Currently, we are witnessing a discursive shift that describes "a set of local, micro-level appropriations of discursive changes" that are "actor-specific responses to social, political, and economic micro-level transformations" and are "nonsimultaneous, contextual, and field dependent" (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, p. 3). In the last decades, researchers observe the 'politicization' of migration that describes how "governments and other political actors would want to present themselves as 'in control' of immigration, which they would ideologically view as a certain 'problem'" (ibid., p. 6). Alongside politicization, researchers identify the mediatization of politics as "one of the main carriers of contemporary immigration discourses and of their long-term politicization" (ibid.; see Forchtner, Krzyżanowski, & Wodak, 2013). Mediatization describes "the process whereby politics

becomes increasingly dependent on both mass media and other facets of mediated practices (most recently via social media/online media)" which transform political practices "into a process of mediated attention-seeking rather than of political representation and policy making" (ibid.). Through mediatization, online and social media have become the main channel of political communication that is cost-efficient and far-reaching and has been particularly interesting for right-wing parties across Europe (Fuchs, 2018; [Krzyżanowski et al., 2018](#); Pajnik & Sauer, 2018). In European media coverage, migrant groups are generally underrepresented (Eberl et al., 2018). When they are represented, they are often constructed as threats of economic, cultural, or criminal nature (ibid.). Researchers find that the commercialization of mass media that "creates economic incentives to attract an audience through personalization and dramatization of news coverage" (Doroshenko, 2018, p. 3188). In Nordic countries, tabloids provide positive coverage of populist movements; in Austria there is even a symbiotic relationship between the far-right FPÖ and the Austrian newspaper *Kronen Zeitung* (ibid.).

The issue of migration became politicized and mediatized in an unprecedented degree during the so called 'refugee crisis' in 2015 that prompted restrictive responses from within the EU to strengthen its borders and prevent refugees from crossing the Mediterranean (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2015, p. 3-4). Existing research confirms that the trend to debate migration and asylum as a threat to the host societies cultural homogeneity, national economy and public security cuts across the entire EU, becoming a hot issue even in countries barely affected by migration. For example, Jarmila Androvičová (2016) demonstrates that migration started to be heatedly debated in Slovakia as a security issue only during the European 'refugee crisis' from which Slovakia remained mostly untouched. Rather than an actual influx of migrants into the country, the sudden public interest in the topic was prompted by nationalist politicians and media outlets that instrumentalized migration for the parliamentary elections in 2016 (ibid.). As for Germany which on Chancellor Angela Merkel's initiative took in around one million refugees in 2015, public debate on the 'refugee crisis' is polarized between humanitarian and securitizing narratives which together reinforce the notion of deservingness measured by the possible benefits a refugee offers for the host society (Holzberg, Kolbe, & Zaborowski, 2018). Criteria of deservingness concern whether a refugee is able to contribute to the national economy, whether he/she represents a (physical) threat (e.g., terrorism) to the local population and whether he/she adheres to the gender and sexual norms in the host society (ibid.). All three strands of discourse are part of the broader public discourse on migration and integration that constructs migrants as economic and security risk for the country of reception and a threat to the 'domestic culture' represented as homogenous, democratic and egalitarian. Claims of security and cultural risks in conjunction with migration are commonly directed at Muslims whose political convictions and cultural practices are considered as particularly violent and patriarchal.

The narrative of deservingness is closely tied to the 'economization' (Calışkan & Callon, 2009) of all spheres of social life under neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a mode of reason and mode of the production of subjects (Brown, 2015, p. 21); it is "a historically specific economic and political reaction against Keynesianism and democratic socialism, as well as

a more generalized practice of 'economizing' spheres and activities heretofore governed by other tables of value" (ibid.). Migration and integration have not been exempt from economization as evidenced by hegemonic discourses on migration and integration in economic terms. Migration either needs to be stopped as migrants burden the labor market and the social welfare system or migration is welcome so long as migrants make verifiable contribution to the host society (Wodak, 2015, p. 31). At the center of debates on migration and integration lie financial cost-and-benefit calculations rather than humans and their lives (ibid.). Similarly, right-wing populism steers the public debate on migration and integration to a specific direction that (re-)defines who belongs to 'us', who is beneficial or represents a threat etc. (ibid., p. 32).

Therefore, national and public security in the context of migration, in Austria as elsewhere in Europe, is strongly coupled with the issue of (failed) integration. Using the critical discourse analysis method, linguist Ruth Wodak finds that right-wing populist terms such as "those unwilling to integrate" (*Integrationsunwillige*) and "unwillingness to integrate" (*Integrationsunwilligkeit*) were employed by the representatives of the FPÖ until 2010, afterwards increasingly by tabloids and since 2014 by the entire political spectrum (ibid., p. 37). Furthermore, researchers find that these terms co-occur most frequently with the words "sanction" (*Strafe*) and "pupils/students" (*Schüler*), for example when a male pupil disrespects a female pedagogue, a father refuses to shake a female teacher's hand or disallows his daughter to participate in the swimming lesson that are considered an attack on 'our basic values' (*unsere Grundwerte*) (ibid., p. 39). The use of right-wing populist terms have become more frequent after the attacks in Paris in January 2015 and is employed particularly in conjunction with schools (ibid.). Edna Ajanovic and colleagues make a similar observation that right-wing populist discourses mark kindergartens and schools as places that are particularly estranged from the majority Austrian population, expressing concern over the disappearance of pork meat, Christian crosses, and Saint Nicholas from the kindergartens due to migrant families of Islamic faith (Ajanovic, Mayer, & Sauer, 2015).

1.2 Crisis

We take 'crisis' as a defining discourse of our time (cf. Brand, 2009), not least in the field of migration and integration (e.g., 'migration crisis', 'refugee crisis', 'integration crisis'). We identify three main problems with the common usage of the term 'crisis'. First, it is commonly used to describe conditions pertaining to macroeconomics, rendering the multilayered character of 'crisis' rather invisible (ibid.). Today, however, we are witnessing a series of interrelated crises: the economic and financial crisis, socioecological crisis, global social division and forced migration, crisis of gender relations and hegemonic masculinity, and the crisis of political institutions (ibid.). Second, 'crisis' often denotes the exceptional experiences of the economically privileged (Bassel & Emejulu, 2014). 'Bad times' in terms of economy are not typically defined as 'crisis' if the affected parties are mainly marginalized groups which serves to normalize long-term unemployment, poverty, homelessness, and gendered and racialized pay gap (Strolovitch, 2013, p. 169). This is not least reflected in the social construction of the 'financial crisis' (2008 onwards) and the

'refugee crisis' (2015) which describe the shock experienced foremost by white middle-classes. Third and finally, in its common usage, 'crisis' selectively reallocates its own source or origin as part of a discursive strategy that allows criticizing *some* but not all aspect of the current social system. In mainstream discourses, the 'economic and financial crisis' is often interpreted as an outcome of common greed and risk behavior of testosterone-driven bankers and managers which serves to ontologize and thus depoliticize the historically constructed system of neoliberalism (Sauer, 2010). These discourses discredit masculinist values and practices (e.g. competition, economic growth) on part of male professionals in the finance sector but disregard that these values and practices are intrinsic to the entire economic system. Here, the source or origin of the crisis is discursively downloaded from the structural to the individual level.

In its common usage in conjunction with migration ('migration crisis', 'refugee crisis'), we find all three aspects addressed above at place. First, it concentrates on one aspect of a social phenomenon considered to be a challenge or risk, namely that migrants arrive and stay in Europe overwhelming the capacities of European nation states, but ignore the reasons why migrants leave their homes in the first place (e.g., ecological crisis, poverty, unemployment, violence). Second, crisis here describes the experience of white European people with mass migration rather than that of the migrants. Migration is constructed as crisis only after migrants reach Europe. Third, the 'migration crisis' discourse ignores inequalities between the Global North and the Global South and the former's responsibility in generating grievances in the South. Here, the source or origin of the crisis is discursively externalized and allocated to the Global South.

The discourse on the so-called 'refugee crisis' in Europe is ideologically charged and stigmatizing for migrants, has served to legitimize special measures which imply broader sociopolitical change and, most crucially, points to a change or shift in hegemonic political agendas (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018). Markus Rheindorf and Ruth Wodak's (2018) analysis of two discourse strands, 'border fence' and 'maximum limit' (to the number of refugees to be accepted to Austria), demonstrates that the normalization of restrictive migration policies in Austria is ongoing, "reactivating old images of protection through fences" (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018, p. 34). Hegemonic discourses maintain that:

"of course, one would love to help and support the 'real' refugees, but international politics and national economic limitations are factual realities that do not allow for idealism of human rights. Border are 'moral', then, also in the sense that politicians can thus make a claim to be acting responsibly, using cost-and-benefit analyses in an effort to protect social security and cohesion — an argument that casts the so-called do-gooders as naïve dreamers of utopian worlds." (ibid.)

Increased level of security is thus constructed as a moral obligation that offers a sober solution to the current state of emergency and crisis. This becomes visible in the now dismissed right-wing ÖVP-FPÖ coalitions government program where integration is

discussed under the section 'order and security'.³ This signifies a discursive shift which reallocates migration and integration from social and labor policy to the realm of national security and public order. Another example concerns a statement on the website of the Austrian Federal Chancellery (*Bundeskanzleramt*) that discusses migration as a security issue and elaborates on the EU's responsibility therein.⁴ Effective protection of the EU's external border is highlighted as a common responsibility of all member states and the creation of a common European asylum system, at the latest since the 'migration crisis' of 2015, is described as a political urgency. In the statement, the safety of European citizens is described as an important task for nation states and that new and complex 'security threats', including terrorism and (Islamist) radicalization, require a common European response. Framing the issue of the increasing numbers of people seeking for international protection in Austria as a 'crisis' is not neutral and may be considered as an instance of Austrian government's symbolic politics used to legitimize restrictive anti-migration policies and common hostile attitudes towards persons affected by these policies.

In the scale of emergency, the upgrading of migration from a social and labor issue to security issue and most recently to the state of a crisis has had implications for the discourses on the neighboring of concept of 'integration'. Integration is currently being redefined as a compulsory process which shall mitigate the harmful effects of migration and a precondition for accessing residence status and social benefits in Austria. Mainstream political actors frame the possibility of the 'refugee crisis' turning into an 'integration crisis' as a major concern. While the state continues to acknowledge own responsibility in providing structures and measures for integration, it emphasizes the individual responsibility of migrants in achieving integration goals. Linguist Ruth Wodak (2015) finds that the term 'unwillingness to integrate' (*Integrationsunwilligkeit*), originally an indicator of right-wing populism, has become normalized by shifting to the center of the political spectrum and serves as a symbol of the restrictive migration policy (*ibid.*, p. 30). This implies to concurrent processes, namely the downloading of the responsibility and task to individuals and the normalization of right-wing notions.

2. Changes in public attitudes towards migration issues

The results of the special Eurobarometer on integration of migrants in the European Union published on 13 April 2018 shows that only 37 percent of Europeans consider themselves to be well-informed about migration and integration.⁵ This is reflected in their responses pertaining to the number of migrants in the EU: In 19 out of 28 member states, people estimate the proportion of migrants in the population at least twice as big as the

³ Zusammen. Für unser Österreich. Regierungsprogramm 2017-2022. https://www.oeh.ac.at/sites/default/files/files/pages/regierungsprogramm_2017-2022.pdf Accessed on 29.09.2019

⁴ Migration und Sicherheit. Welche Rolle spielt die EU bei Migration und Sicherheit? <https://www.bundeskanzleramt.gv.at/agenda/europapolitik/migration-und-sicherheit.html>

⁵ Results of special Eurobarometer on integration of immigrants in the European Union. <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/results-special-eurobarometer-integration-immigrants-european-union> Accessed on 29.09.2019.

actual proportion. 61 percent of respondents interact weekly with migrants, 57 percent say they feel comfortable having any type of social relations with migrants and 40 percent actually have friends and family members who are migrants. 54 percent of Europeans think that the integration of migrants is successful although figures vary between countries. Interestingly, countries with smaller number of non-EU migrants are less likely to believe that the integration of migrants is successful or that migrants have a positive impact on the host society. 42 percent of the respondents from Austria believe that there are more migrants staying in Austria legally (EU average: 39 percent) and 44 percent believe that there are more illegal migrants than legal migrants or about the same number of illegal and legal migrants staying in Austria (EU average: 47 percent). 44 percent of the respondents from Austria say that they would feel comfortable to have any type of social relation with a migrant (EU average: 57 percent) whereas 48 percent say that they would feel uncomfortable having at least one type of social relation with a migrant (EU average: 34 percent). According to the initial results of a recent European Values Survey, 32 percent of the respondents in Austria fully agree or agree that migrants take away jobs from Austrians.⁶ 70 percent fully agree or agree that migrants aggravate the problem of criminality. Not least, 74 percent fully agree or agree that migrants burden the social welfare system. Changing public attitude towards migration and migrants is manifested not least in the growing electoral success of right-wing populist parties whose discourses come to dominate the public debate. A survey commissioned by the Austrian Integration Fund shows that the issue of integration of migrants and refugees is the main source of concern within the general public, ranking higher on the priority list than issues related to pensions, taxes and economic development.⁷ According to the same survey, three-quarters of the participant express concern over the spread of 'radical Islam', of the integration of migrants and refugees especially at schools and work, and of refugee influx. When asked about their understanding of a successful integration, 100 percent of the participants mention compliance with Austrian laws and German proficiency. Nine participants out of ten mention adaptation to 'Austrian values' and (economic) self-reliance. For three-quarters of the participants, migrants are responsible for their own integration while more than half acknowledge state responsibility. These survey results are in line with the above discussion on the neoliberal economization of migration and integration as they build on an economic cost-and-benefit calculation. They are also in line with the general trend to securitize migration as well as to discipline and privatize integration (emphasis on migrants' 'own responsibility' to adapt to 'Austrian values').

Current public opinion and attitudes are widely shaped by a historically specific constellation of the processes of commercialization of media (Doroshenko, 2018), mediatization of politics (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018) and politicization of migration (ibid.). The proliferation and commercialization of medial channels has triggered what some experts call 'newsroom populism' when "market forces impel media organizations to attract viewers by relying on sensational coverage, expressed emotionalism, personalization, and

⁶ Erste Ergebnisse der Europäischen Wertestudie. Teil 1: Politik und sozialer Zusammenhalt. https://www.werteforschung.at/fileadmin/user_upload/p_inter_werteforschung/EVS_Politik_sozialer_Zusammenhalt.pdf Accessed on 29.09.2019.

⁷ GfK-Studie: Was denkt Österreich? <https://www.integrationsfonds.at/publikationen/gfk-studie-was-denkt-oesterreich/> Accessed on 29.09.2019.

blatantly plainspoken discourse” (Doroshenko, 2018, p. 3187). Existing research in Europe furthermore suggests that commercial media outlets are more likely to promote far-right parties (ibid., p. 3188). In this flourishing commercial mass media landscape, politics, including the issue of migration, becomes increasingly mediatized in that politics becomes dependent on mediation (Krzyżanowski et al., 2018, p. 3). The society increasingly relies on mediated discourses and images which shape their political opinion and voting behavior (Eberl et al., 2018).

Media coverage which represents migration as threatening for the host community influences audiences’ political attitudes (Eberl et al., 2018). When threat scenarios evolve around economy, culture and security, they prove to be more influential on attitudes towards migrants and migration (ibid., p. 217). Exposure to negative media coverage over time even activates stereotypical perceptions of migrants, influencing news consumers’ political party preferences (ibid.). For example, research finds that the readers of the Austrian Kronen Zeitung which is ideologically close to the political far-right are more likely to cast ballots for far-right parties (Doroshenko, 2018, p. 3197).

3. Representations of migrants and refugees

The changing discourses and public attitudes towards migration harbor specific images of migrants and refugees as to who they are, where they come from, what their true intentions are, and what their responsibility and status in the host society should be. In the context of securitization, migrants are represented, in Austria as elsewhere, a risk and threat on numerous levels. Some strands of the security discourse point to the risk of direct physical violence coming from (Muslim) migrants with extremist and terrorist agendas. Others point to non-violent, long-term social transformation from within that would permanently change the fabric of the Austrian society such as ‘radicalization’ or ‘Islamization’. Both strands are interlinked and together feed into the ‘migration and security’ discursive pair. In there, Muslim migrants are constructed as a security risk to the state and society — a discursive image that is legitimized with reference to terrorist attacks in European metropolises in the last decade. Furthermore, a rather latent yet far-reaching risk is claimed to lie in the gradual ‘infiltration’ of the Austrian society believed to champion democracy and gender equality. Male Muslim migrants are depicted as hypersexual and exceptionally patriarchal due to their cultural socialization not least witnessed, the argument goes, in the mass sexual assaults and rapes that took place in New Year’s Eve 2015-2016 in Cologne, Germany (cf. Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018). Critical gender researcher Paul Scheibelhofer (2012) convincingly argues that whereas the early ‘guest worker’ regime conducted health checks on migrants as they were mainly seen as work objects, in the context of securitization new images of dangerous migrant masculinities are promoted. The Islamic veil is further proposed as a manifestation of Muslim women’s patriarchal oppression (by Muslim men) as opposed to the emancipated and sexually liberated Austrian women. Children who are socialized in this exceptionally violent and patriarchal family environment that is seen as antithetical to the Austrian way of living are considered as a

major problem. This explains why schools and kindergartens are increasingly pulled into the public debate on cultural incompatibility and failed integration.

Besides being a threat to national security and the 'Austrian culture and values', migrants and refugees are believed to pose a massive economic burden on the Austrian welfare system and the labor market. Right wing FPÖ cultivates images of "lazy migrants" and "bogus refugees" who exploit the Austrian welfare system and unemployment benefits (Rheindorf & Wodak, 2018, p. 18).

4. Conclusions

One key conclusion we draw from our political and media discourse analysis is that migration and integration are the hot issues in contemporary Austrian politics. By hot issue, we mean a topic that works as a main marker of political difference between competing political actors and projects and is politically polarizing. Related to this, another key finding is that migration is made to a security issue and integration to a disciplinary measure. In policy documents, migration and integration are constructed as pertaining to public order and national security. This signals a discursive and institutional reallocation of migration and integration from labor and social policy to the realm of security policy. While migration is constructed as an economic, cultural, and security risk factor, integration is framed as a political strategy to mitigate the social risks arising from migration. A sense of threat, risk, and, since 2015, crisis pulls through public discourses. This paves the way for and serves to legitimize a policy environment guided by the security maxim.

Existing literature points to, and this is our third finding, the key role media coverage plays in the discursive construction of migration and migrants. Commercialization of media, mediatization of politics, and politicization of migration allow emotionalization and personalization in media coverage which further benefits right-wing discourses on migration and integration. In Austrian media, migration and integration ranked the highest among the most frequently covered issues. An earlier study finds that right-wing terms such as "those unwilling to integrate" or "unwillingness to integrate" have been adopted by tabloids since the 2010 (Wodak, 2015). Our fourth finding refers to existing research which confirms that exposure to media coverage influences voting behavior and assumes a link between the underrepresentation as well as bad representations of migrants in media coverage and the political success of right-wing parties. A recent survey shows that most people in Austria consider migration and integration the most urgent political issue and express concern over 'radical Islam'.

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DENMARK

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1. Main debates on migration in the last five years

1.1 Introduction to the Danish context (before 2014)

In this chapter, an overview of the main debates on migration in Denmark in the last five years is presented, focusing on problematisations of migration and the solutions proposed. In order to provide understanding of the current debate, however, an introduction to the Danish context is necessary. Generally speaking, Denmark is the least immigrant-friendly country in Scandinavia according to SCANPUB's analysis of immigration media coverage in the region from 1970 to 2016. (Gripsrud 2019). Hence, scepticism towards immigration is not a new phenomenon in Denmark and no major changes appear to have taken place during the last five years, although they should be seen in the context of the history of immigration in the country. As Gripsrud (2019) points out, the current Danish tendency of nationalist scepticism towards immigrants, especially Muslims, can be traced back to Grundtvig, an influential Danish 19th century thinker of nationalism and education and his 'blend of

nationalism and Christianity' as well as the country's self-understanding as 'small and vulnerable' (Gripsrud 2019: 134). A brief introduction to the history of immigration in the Danish context since the 1960s is given below.

As in other European countries, Denmark experienced labour migration in the 1960s, mainly by male 'guest workers'. Although labour migration was limited in the 1970s due to the economic crisis, migration in this period continued in the form of family reunifications. In addition, a number of Vietnamese boat refugees came into the country in the 1970s.

In 1983 the Danish parliament passed a new Immigration Act, which resulted in the Danish refugee system being one of the most liberal in Europe. In the years that followed, refugees from countries including Iran, Lebanon (especially Palestinians), Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia arrived in Denmark (Nielsen 2011).

However, the 1990s were characterised by a yet harsher debate on migration, initially led by the populist right-wing Progress Party and from 1995 by The Danish People's Party, also a populist right-wing party that broke away from The Progress Party.

In 1999 the Danish parliament passed an Integration Act, which was the first of its kind in a Western country (Jensen, Weibel and Vitus 2017) and which emphasised the responsibility of immigrants regarding integration and adapting to fundamental Danish values (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013). In the 2001 parliamentary election, which was dubbed the 'immigration election' due to immigration being the dominant issue, the Danish People's Party became the third-largest party (12 per cent of the vote) and a coalition partner of the new Liberal Conservative minority government. A new Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration was established, marking 'Denmark's *Sonderweg* departure since 2001 from a common Scandinavian naturalisation regime towards increasingly heavy-handed conditionalities, and easier loss of nationality' (Borevi, Jensen and Mouritsen 2017: 7).

Hence, the current migration debate and policies in Denmark, which is focused on in the next section, have preconditions that can be traced back to the 1990s and 2000s. For example, in 2004 the then government introduced a 'Ghetto strategy' directed at areas with public housing and inhabitants on low incomes and a so-called non-Western background, and in 2010 it launched a 'Ghetto list' based on official 'ghetto criteria'. It should therefore be noted that although the government's classification of areas with many inhabitants of migrant background as 'ghettos' has become a central theme in the Danish migration debate during the last five years, the authorities' use of the 'ghetto' concept – controversial in the sense that Denmark by all accounts is the only European country that uses the concept – dates back to 2004.

In short, it seems that the historical development of the migration policy and discourse in Denmark over recent decades can be characterised as a movement from liberal and democratic values focusing on the equal rights of refugees and migrants, towards a tighter or harsher approach to immigration that puts pressure on newcomers to meet demands and

fulfil obligations. However, the discourse still draws on liberal values, but in a 'tougher version' which is in accordance with the nationalist ideology represented by Danish People's Party, and stresses the 'duty of immigrants to (re)form themselves into autonomous and active citizens and to conform to an increasingly comprehensive set of public values, practices and norms' (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013: 707). Hence, in Denmark, tendencies of liberal and neo-liberal thinking are combined with nationalist thinking, leading to a form of egalitarian republicanism (Mouritsen and Olsen 2013).

1.2 Main debates 2015-2019

In the following section, an overview of the main debates on migration in Denmark in the last five years is presented, focusing on the main political initiatives relating to migration. These initiatives both highlight problems and suggest solutions. Political initiatives, ranging from statements in the media made by politicians, to governmental policy documents and new bills, have influenced the agenda in Denmark the last five years, and have led to attention and headlines in international media as well. Chapter 3 has more detail about the intertwined relations between the political discourse and the media agenda in Denmark.

As stated above, the problematisation of migration is not a new phenomenon in the debate and political discourse in Denmark. Both before and since 2015, the main debates on migration have been concentrated on immigrants and refugees from the so-called non-Western countries. The term non-Western is an official term used by Statistics Denmark and other Danish authorities, covering all countries except EU and associated countries plus Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand (Elmeskov 2019).

A recurring theme in debate as well as in politics has therefore been Muslim immigrants and refugees from non-Western countries, focusing on differences related to culture, religion, and employment. Since the 2000s, this discussion has been associated with a concern about the social cohesion of Danish society, drawing on the assumption that citizens' support for the welfare state is dependent on a certain degree of trust and solidarity, which in turn is dependent on cultural homogeneity, otherwise known as the social cohesion argument for restrictive immigration policies (Holtug 2010).

Tokenism or 'symbolic politics'

As mentioned above, there has been an increasing political focus on the obligations and duties of immigrants and refugees to adjust to Danish culture, learn the language and become self-supporting. This also involves addressing refugees and migrants directly in order to remind them of their duties. Thus, in the spring of 2015, prior to the parliamentary election in June 2015, the Social Democratic Party launched a campaign featuring advertising posters with a photo of former Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt and the text 'If you come to Denmark, you must work!'. This was a familiar approach for right-wing parties such as the Danish People's Party, but was new for the Social Democrats (Stokes-

Dupass 2017).

After the parliamentary election, a new Liberal-Conservative minority government was formed. A Ministry of Immigration and Integration was established, led by the Liberal Party's Inger Støjberg. In September 2015, Støjberg replicated the direct address to refugees and migrants as she published an advertising campaign in Lebanese newspapers stating that 'Denmark has decided to tighten the regulations concerning refugees in a number of areas' (Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing 2015) to include reducing social benefits, limiting access to residence permits and family reunions, and rapid expulsion of rejected asylum seekers. Although researchers doubted the effect on potential asylum seekers (Binderup 2015), the campaign turned out to have a symbolic impact on the public debate and resulted in international headlines.

This is one of several examples of what is known in Danish as *symbolpolitik*: tokenism or symbolic politics involving initiatives that may have few practical consequences, but huge symbolic impact. Another example is the 'Jewellery Bill' passed in 2016 by an 81 – 27 majority in parliament, allowing the seizure of valuables worth more than 10,000 Danish kr. from asylum seekers entering Denmark. Although the bill was only enforced 10 times in the subsequent three years and none of these occasions involved confiscating jewellery (Ritzau 2019), it gained both national and international attention. A third example is the establishment of a so-called 'tightening ticker' (*stramningstæller*) on the website of the Ministry of Immigration, Integration and Housing in 2015. This ticker counted every new tightening of immigration regulation. In 2017, the Minister of Immigration and Integration Inger Støjberg posted a photo of herself on social media holding a cake accompanied by a message: 'Today I got the 50th amendment to tighten immigration controls ratified. This needs celebrating!' This caused national debate and international headlines. When a new Social Democratic government came to power in 2019, the ticker, which by then had reached 114, was removed from the website, although the new minister ensured that the tight immigration legislation line would continue. A fourth example is the 'Burqa ban' passed in 2018, directed at the estimated 150-200 Muslim women in Denmark who wear niqabs or burqas.

Social movements and counter reactions

In 2015, Denmark experienced a large influx of refugees from Syria. Some wanted asylum in Denmark and others were travelling through Denmark with the aim of arriving in Sweden. When refugees walked on the Danish roads on their way to Sweden in September 2015, it became symbolic for both immigration sceptics and for new waves of volunteers wanting to welcome refugees to Denmark.

The best-known movement is Venligboerne, 'the friendly neighbours' established in the small provincial town of Hjørring in October 2014 by local volunteers wanting to welcome refugees at the local asylum centre by establishing a café, library and other initiatives. The movement rapidly grew through social media and local groups were set up all over Denmark

with 101 cities and islands represented, with membership reaching 150,000 in 2019.⁸ In addition to supporting social networks between immigrants and Danes and organising activities such as sharing food, clothing and furniture, Venligboerne also offers free legal counselling on asylum and family reunion procedures. The movement has become a prominent voice in the debate on the approach to refugees and can be seen as providing a social framework that serves as an alternative to the state's legal framework (Agustín and Jørgensen 2019).

Another important counter-reaction is embodied by Refugees Welcome, a small, voluntary humanitarian organisation whose primary role is to offer legal advice, assistance and information to asylum seekers.⁹

Also representing alternative approaches to asylum processes is the Trampoline House¹⁰ in Copenhagen. Established in 2010, it is a self-governing institution run by paid staff, interns and volunteers and financed by public and private funding, support events and donations. The Trampoline House offers a range of activities, job training for refugees, education, counselling, etc. In 2017, the People's Movement for the Future of Asylum Children¹¹ was founded in the Trampoline House. The movement works to ensure better legal and living conditions for asylum children in Denmark, not least those children living in the much debated and criticised deportation centre Sjælsmark.

Action plans directed at immigrants and their descendants

In March 2018, the former government published a proposal 'One Denmark without parallel societies. No ghettos in 2030'.¹² As mentioned earlier, the Danish state's official naming of certain housing areas as 'ghettos' goes back to 2004. However, with the 'ghetto plan' in 2018 and the laws subsequently ratified by the Danish parliament, the topic became central to the debate on migration in Denmark. With the new plan, a category of 'hard ghettos' was introduced. A decisive criterion for this category was that the proportion of non-Western immigrants and descendants in a certain area exceeded 50 per cent. Hence, non-Western immigrants and descendants were the centre of attention, which is also clearly reflected in the use of the concept of 'parallel societies' referring to areas with inhabitants with non-Western background. Here is one example of the government's 'ghetto plan':

'There are holes in the map of Denmark. Many people live in more or less isolated enclaves. Here, too many of the citizens do not take sufficient responsibility. They do not actively participate in Danish society and the labour market. We have got a group of citizens who do not adopt Danish norms and values. Where women are considered less

⁸ <http://venligboerne.dk>

⁹ <https://refugeeswelcome.dk>

¹⁰ <https://www.trampolinehouse.dk>

¹¹ <https://www.trampolinehouse.dk/peoples-movement>

¹² The proposal is also described in D 3.1 (Denmark) with particular respect to language testing of children in grade 0.

worthy than men. Where social control and lack of equality limit the individual's freedom of expression. We see environments where in some cases a negative spiral of counterculture arises. Parallel societies are a major burden on the social cohesion of society as well as on the individual.' (Regeringen 2018: 5).

The plan led to comprehensive legislative changes in the autumn of 2018. These included mandatory day care, teaching 'Danish language and values', for one year-old children living in the areas, demolishing even newly renovated buildings in 'hard ghettos', restricting economic benefits, doubling punishment for crimes committed within 'ghetto areas', etc. The initiatives and their targeting of citizens with non-Western (often Muslim) background have a majority backing in the Danish parliament and are endorsed by both the former Liberal-Conservative government and the Social Democratic government which was elected in 2019. However, they have led to a widespread debate both in national and international media, often raising questions around discrimination and the harsh rhetoric and restrictions aimed at immigrants.

Another initiative that has caused debate is the 'paradigm shift' in immigration policy, involving a number of restrictions on foreigners. This plan was adopted by the former Liberal-Conservative government, the Danish People's Party and the Social Democrats in February 2019 with the 'Law 140 Proposal for amendments to the Aliens Act, the Integration Act, the Repatriation Act and various other laws'. The Act contains amendments within, among others, the Aliens Act, the Integration Act, and municipal and regional electoral law. The main points of the Law, which have also been the subject of widespread debates, are that residence permits for foreigners must be temporary, the Minister for Immigration can limit the number of family reunions each month, the penalty for breaking an entry ban is significantly increased and the integration allowance (the public benefit for newcomers to Denmark) is renamed 'self-support allowance' or 'return travel allowance'. At the same time, benefits are reduced considerably.

Although the immigration policy in Denmark, as mentioned, has become increasingly restrictive during recent decades, the new changes were nevertheless labelled a 'paradigm shift'; a term mainly promoted by the Danish People's Party. As the Party's Member of Parliament Peter Skaarup put it:

'You have to get used to the fact that when you come to Denmark, you are here temporarily, and when you have had temporary shelter, you will go back again (...) This means that we are turning around the whole policy in this area – from today being about integration, to being about repatriation.' (Ingvorsen, 2019)

2. Changes of public attitudes towards migration issues

2.1 Introduction

In line with the polarisation in debates on migration discussed in the above chapter,

public attitudes towards migration issues in Denmark also seem to be characterised by ambivalence. Longitudinal research on the attitudes of Danish citizens towards migration show that public opinions towards migration have been stable during the last three decades, i.e. tolerance did not change significantly during the cartoon crisis in 2005-2006 (Sniderman, Petersen, Slothuus and Stubager 2014). A relatively tolerant attitude coexists with debate around widespread immigration scepticism and restrictive policies. One explanation for this may be that Danes are tolerant towards Muslims but not towards those whom they see as Islamists (Sniderman, Petersen, Slothuus and Stubager 2014). The political swing to the right and the brutalised 'tone in the debate' does not therefore necessarily reflect public attitudes towards immigration.

As Heath and Richards (2019), drawing on the European Social Survey (ESS), point out, most European countries have less positive attitudes towards Muslim immigrants compared to migrants of the same race or ethnic group as the country. However, compared with other European countries, Denmark is relatively favourable to Muslim immigration, in line with other countries with large Muslim populations such as the UK, France and Germany. This is in accordance with the theory that contact reduces prejudices (Heath and Richards 2019: 11).

A survey has also shown that Danes have become more positive towards a multicultural society over the years. In 1995, 16 per cent said that they wanted a multicultural Denmark, whereas the proportion in 2011 was 54 per cent. However it should also be noted that while in 1997, 75 per cent agreed on the statement that immigrants should adapt to Danish culture and norms, in 2011 92 per cent agreed on this (Holst 2018). In a newspaper article on these changes, social science scholar Jens Peter Frølund Thomsen explains that a majority of Danes are open towards immigrants, but only on condition that immigrants adapt or even assimilate to Danish culture (Holst 2018).

2.2 Changes of public attitudes towards migration 2015-2018

According to the Observatory of Public Attitudes to Migration (OPAM), public attitudes have changed in the following ways during recent years:

| | 2015 | 2018 |
|-------------------------------------|------|---------|
| Positive towards EU immigration | 61 % | 70.84 % |
| Negative towards EU immigration | 32 % | 22.86 % |
| Positive towards non-EU immigration | 29 % | 42 % |
| Negative towards non-EU immigration | 62 % | 57.74 % |

Table 1. Source: <http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/opam/>



As the table indicates, Danes became slightly more positive towards migration between 2015 and 2018, with a relatively larger increase in the positive attitude towards non-EU immigration. As noted in chapter 1, however, the influx of refugees in Denmark was significantly lower in 2018 than in 2015.

3. Representations of migrants and refugees

This section describes the main categorisations and representations of migrants and refugees in Denmark during the last five years. The chapter begins with a brief introduction to official categorisations by Danish authorities (such as Statistics Denmark and the Ministry of Education), as such categorisations may also be seen as representations of migrants and refugees. The main part of the chapter discusses the media representation of migrants and refugees in Denmark. At the end of the chapter, stereotypes in the education system are discussed and a recent debate on the consequences of negative representations for the health and wellbeing of ethnic minorities in Denmark is included.

3.1 Official categorizations of migrants and refugees in Denmark

This section discusses official categorisations of migrants and refugees in Denmark. As mentioned in chapter 1, Statistics Denmark distinguishes between Danes, Western immigrants and non-Western immigrants. Furthermore, Statistics Denmark uses the categories Danish origin, immigrants and descendants. This means that a person born in Denmark or who has Danish parents is not necessarily counted as Danish by the state, but may be placed in the category 'descendant'. The distinctions are explained as follows:

A person is of Danish origin if he or she has at least one parent who is both a Danish citizen and born in Denmark. Neither immigrants nor descendants have one parent who is both a Danish citizen and born in Denmark. The difference between immigrants and descendants is that immigrants are born abroad, while descendants are born in Denmark. (Statistics Denmark 2019)

This categorisation has been used in statistics, for example Statistic Denmark's annual report 'Immigrants in Denmark', which published statistics on immigrants and descendants from the perspective of various statistical areas such as population, labour market, education, public welfare and crime. It also has implications for housing policies such as the 'ghetto policies' mentioned in chapter 1. Hence, a decisive criterion for a neighbourhood to be defined as 'ghetto' is that the proportion of immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries among the residents exceeds 50 per cent.

Another relevant categorisation is persons 'with an ethnic background other than Danish'. In the public education sector, students belonging to this category are studied separately when it comes to school results. Hence, as a supplement to the international PISA studies, the Ministry of Education has supported separate 'PISA Ethnic' reports in Denmark in 2009,

2012 and 2015. These studies focus specifically on three categories: 'pupils without immigrant background (at least one of the parents born in Denmark)', 'immigrant pupils who speak Danish at home' and 'immigrant pupils'. This third group is further divided into first-generation students (born outside Denmark) and second-generation students (born in Denmark).

In other contexts, the Ministry of Education uses the category 'bilingual pupils' which is defined in the following way: 'Bilingual children are understood as children who have a mother tongue other than Danish and who do not learn Danish until they come into contact with the surrounding environment, possibly through instruction in public school.' (Article 1, Law on primary and lower secondary school teaching in Danish as a second language 2016).

3.2 Representations of migrants and refugees in the Danish media

The development of the way migrants and refugees are represented in the Danish media over a period of five years is covered in media researcher Hanne Jørndrup's report "*The people we talk about*": *Ethnic minorities in Danish news media* (2017). The report is based on the coding of 2966 news sources in 1190 news stories from nine Danish media (newspapers and the two main national TV channels) from selected days in the first 14 weeks of 2016. The report is a follow-up to a similar 2012 report, the aim of both reports being to map the news media picture of ethnic minorities based on these questions: How much space do immigrants and descendants take up in the Danish news picture, what news stories do they appear in, and what role do they play in news coverage? (Jørndrup 2017: 3)

By comparing the 2012 and the 2017 mappings it has been possible to study the development of the representation of ethnic minorities over time in the Danish media. The report concludes that there is a statistical underrepresentation of ethnic minorities in the news picture. In 2016, ethnic minorities¹³ made up 12.3 per cent of the population but they only appear in 4 per cent of news sources in the media surveyed. This underrepresentation had increased since the 2012 study, which showed that 10 per cent of the population with ethnic minority background appeared in just under 5 per cent of the news sources (Jørndrup 2017: 6).

The report shows that female minority sources are subjected to a double dose of underrepresentation. In the studied material, female sources are generally underrepresented, as only approximately one-third of the sources are women. However, for ethnic Danish sources, the distribution is 33 per cent female and 67 per cent male, whereas

¹³ Although aware of the challenges associated with ethnic categorisation, the report distinguishes, based on the names of sources, between 'ethnic Danish / majority sources' and 'ethnic minorities / minority sources'. Furthermore, Statistics Denmark's distinction between Western and non-Western countries is used to distinguish between minority sources (Jørndrup 2017: 5). When using the category ethnic minorities in general the report includes immigrants and descendants, cf. Statistic Denmark's definitions (Jørndrup 2017: 10).

for minority sources, 29 per cent are women and 71 per cent are men. Thus, minority women are underrepresented through both gender and ethnicity (Jørndrup 2017: 6).

Furthermore, the report finds that minority sources appear in isolated 'news sanctuaries'. This implies that non-Western news sources almost exclusively appear in stories in the field of immigration, religion (which means stories about Islam) and crime, hence themes problematising the inclusion of ethnic minorities as citizens of Denmark (Jørndrup 2017: 6). However, in the political coverage of foreigners, minority sources are absent. Although the largest concentration of minority sources is found in the coverage of foreigners, almost exclusively majority sources (primarily decision-makers) appear in the political stories linked to issues of foreigners, immigration and integration (Jørndrup 2017: 6).

30 per cent of non-Western minority sources were found in stories on crime and terrorism, hence minority sources are often used as sources in cases of minority crime. Based on the source material, the study cannot conclude whether ethnic minorities are over- or underrepresented in relation to the proportion of convicted criminals in Denmark who are from ethnic minorities. However, it is concluded that minority sources appear in crime coverage when it comes to special "ethnic minority issues" such as violence in "immigrant families", male refugees' sexual abuse of women and terrorism cases (Jørndrup 2017: 7).

The report also finds that the use of minority sources used as expert sources increased during the five years between 2012 and 2017. In 2012, there were almost no minority sources used as expert sources, but this had changed by 2017. However, when minority sources appeared as expert sources it happened primarily in stories about foreigners, religion (mainly Islam), etc.

Media as contributing to the political agenda

Jørndrup (2017) discusses whether the media picture reflects pre-existing power relations and representation in society, or whether the media independently contributes to shaping the news image of ethnic minorities. The study provides answers that point in both directions. On the one hand, media source usage reflects society, particularly regarding the absence of minorities among decision-makers in the material. As decision-makers are a dominant source group in the news media, the absence of minorities among decision-makers reinforces the total number of minority sources. On the other hand, media is also found to contribute actively to the image of ethnic minorities, as the material shows that a very large proportion of minority sources appear in a number of high-priority self-produced stories, which are placed on the agenda by the media themselves. One example is several critical stories on the second largest national TV channel about 'immigrant communities' and mosques, such as the documentary series *Mosques behind the Veil* (2016), which questioned whether minorities' religion, family patterns and traditions are compatible with Danish laws, traditions and norms (Jørndrup 2017: 15).

Suhr and Sinclair (2016) discuss the relationship between media coverage and the

political agenda, focusing especially on media coverage of Muslims. On the basis of two case studies of the coverage of the terror attack in Copenhagen in February 2015 and the aforementioned TV documentary series on mosques in Denmark (2016), they argue that media often co-produce the political agenda. They also argue that the media coverage has not only created an emotional political debate, but may also have contributed to an escalation of the problems that the media sought to uncover. Thus, the two cases resulted in both new legislative measures and changes to existing legislation.

In the 2015 attack in Copenhagen, two civilians were killed by a man who had a criminal record, and who shortly before the attack had committed himself to ISIS on Facebook. In the media the attack was interpreted as Islamist terrorism and led to a debate on foreign (Syria) fighters, although the killer was not a foreign fighter. At the time of the incident, the former government was already planning new terrorism legislation, and 12 initiatives were released shortly after the attack. The 'terror plan' resulted in a donation of almost DKK 1 billion to intelligence services, the police, and the protection of threatened individuals. In comparison, less than DKK 60 million was allocated for the prevention of radicalisation by other authorities such as the field of social work or education.

In 2016, TV2 (the second largest TV channel in Denmark) launched the self-produced documentary series *Mosques behind the Veil*. Based on criticism from young Muslims who had experienced repressive treatment in their families based on conservative interpretations of Islam, TV2 wanted to investigate how Muslim families were advised by imams in mosques. Hence, two undercover journalists recorded imams in eight Danish mosques who were caught on hidden camera revealing 'highly controversial and compromising statements, which the same imams would very likely deny if directly asked by a Danish journalist' (Suhr and Sinclair 2016: 140).

The TV series caused great debate in the media, led not least by special broadcasts on the sister channel TV2 News, and among politicians. In spite of disagreement among researchers as to the actual content of the Arab imam quotes, the general tendency was criticism towards Islam and Muslims. As a direct consequence of the broadcast, legislation was passed to limit the practice of imams, a list of certain preachers denied entry into Denmark was published, public support for associations 'against democracy' was restricted, inspection of Muslim private schools was increased, etc.

According to Suhr and Sinclair (2016), the two cases illustrate a general tendency in the media coverage of Muslims in Denmark. They warn that since politicians have no choice but to react to media coverage, it may constitute a democratic problem if the media coverage of significant societal problems were inadequate and simplified.

Suhr and Sinclair argue that firstly, the Danish Islam debate presents certain religious practices as the primary explanation for problems of integration and radicalisation, omitting the more complex and multi-faceted explanations that professionals and researchers in the field try to put forward. Hence, a one-sided focus on religion may mean that the Danish society loses its opportunity to effectively prevent, for example, radicalisation and illegal

practices among minorities (Suhr and Sinclair 2016: 135).

Secondly, it seems that the simplified media debate contributes to a strengthening of the most extreme religious environments, legitimising their opinions and exclusive religious practices with reference to misinformation in Danish media (Suhr and Sinclair 2016: 135).

Public attitudes to media representations

Immigrants and their descendants, especially those of so-called non-Western or Muslim background, are often represented negatively in the Danish media (Gripsrud 2019, Jørndrup 2017, Suhr and Sinclair 2016). It also appears that the Danish public has noticed a bias in the media coverage. According to Eurobarometer (2018) Denmark has the highest proportion of respondents of all EU countries (59 per cent) who think that that the media presents immigrants in an overly negative way (Special Eurobarometer 2018: 8).

The proportion of respondents saying that negative portrayals of immigrants in the media may be an obstacle to integration is also among the highest in Denmark: 92 per cent (Special Eurobarometer 2018: 103). Furthermore, Denmark is among the countries with the lowest proportion of respondents agreeing that the media present matters concerning immigrants in an objective way (26 per cent) (Special Eurobarometer 2018: 158).

3.3 Stereotypes in education

In the above sections, categorisations and representations of immigrants and descendants have been discussed. It can be seen that there is in the political and media discourse a widespread focus on non-Western immigrants and descendants, often with an emphasis on Muslims. This focus in the discourse, often expressed as concerns and criticism, correlates with the use of stereotypes. In recent decades, research on education, and especially on primary and lower secondary school, has studied stereotypes, discrimination and racialisation, which may be seen in relation to the aforementioned overall discourse. Although the following short introduction does not do justice to the comprehensiveness of this research, it will briefly present the key points regarding the representation of migrants and refugees in education.

Numerous qualitative studies have focused on ethnic minority children in primary and lower secondary school (both building on ethnographic fieldwork, such as Kofoed 2003, Gitz-Johansen 2006, Gilliam 2009, Lagermann 2013, Jaffe-Walter 2016, and studies in history of education, such as Buchardt, 2016, Padovan-Özdemir, 2016, Kristjánsdóttir, 2018).

The ethnographic studies reveal that when teachers talk about migrant children and children with migrant background they use different concepts such as foreign children, bilingual children, children with an ethnic background other than Danish, or Muslim children. What these categories have in common is that they comprise the category of non-Western children (both immigrants and descendants), which as mentioned is officially used by the

Danish state. The studies also find that teachers have concerns about these children, which are often related to a deficit discourse and to low expectations.

Researchers have often used the term 'ethnic minority children' when studying the approach to these children in the education system. However, recently the term 'minority Danish' has been suggested as an alternative, due to problematic connotations of the term ethnicity (Gilliam 2018). There also seems recently to be an emerging focus on race and racialisation. Hence, in everyday practice in school, the category of non-Western refers to visible characteristics such as the children's skin and hair being of a darker tone and colour than the average Danish child. Racialisation processes occur when children are seen as belonging to different 'kinds' of humans with different cultures. This distinction is based on visible characteristics such as hair colour and skin tone, but also often on clothing such as the hijab, seen as representing Islam, or streetwear, which is often associated by adults with 'gangs' and crime. Minority Danish boys in particular seem to be at the centre of professional concerns and low expectations (Gilliam 2018).

3.4 Implications for health and wellbeing

Khawaja and Parwani (2019), representing a newly initiated network of 130 psychologists and psychology students against discrimination, argued in an op-ed that the tone of the debate in Denmark is even detrimental to the health of minority Danes. They claim that psychologists increasingly find that their minority Danish clients are affected by discriminatory rhetoric and exclusionary policies and legislation. For example, young people express anxiety and stress about their future in Denmark, parents address concerns about their children's wellbeing, and adults who feel alienated and powerless witness what the psychologists call the extreme right-wing turn. According to Khawaja and Parwani (2019), ethnic majority Danes are also expressing fear and concern about the aggressiveness of the debate, which was recently expressed in the 2019 election campaign.

4. Debate and conclusions

In this report an overview of the Danish political and media discourse and general public opinion about migration from 2014 onwards has been given. However, it has been necessary to include data from before 2014, since the current developments should be seen in continuity with the development since the 1990s.

As discussed in the report, the overall impression of the Danish discourse is that it is characterised by complexity. As for the media discourse, on the one hand, there is no doubt that it is biased towards negative representations of immigrants. But on the other hand, surveys show that Danish citizens are concerned about the negative representations and do not find them appropriate. A parallel ambivalence is found as regards the political discourse and the increasingly restrictive immigration policies that have given Denmark numerous international headlines and caused heated national debates. This has especially been the

case with policies of tokenism or symbolism such as the Jewellery Bill, Burqa ban, 'ghetto' policies of mandatory day care, etc., which on the one hand are ratified by a parliament majority (and hence approved by Danish voters) but which on the other hand seem to cause a certain discomfort amongst the public. It should also be noted that, simultaneously with the restrictions following the influx of refugees from Syria and other countries in 2015, new social movements such as Venligboerne (the friendly neighbours) have emerged, which try to influence the negative discourse on immigrants as well as helping refugees with food, clothes, etc. to compensate for the currently very restricted economic benefits for newly arrived refugees. However, these tendencies should not mask the fact that when it comes to receiving newcomers, Denmark is characterised by a certain degree of harshness and restrictiveness. Especially with regard to children, it should be noted that there is a risk of stereotyping, discrimination and racialisation in the education system (as shown by numerous studies). Furthermore, according to psychologists, the concerns caused by the political discourse and its symbolic politics, may have serious consequences for children's wellbeing.



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POLAND

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1. Migration issues in public discourse before the “refugee crisis”

Before the outburst of so called “refugee crisis” migration issues had always been in the shadows of the mainstream social problems. Analysis of this debate is however essential to understand how the migration issues were used to do politics in Poland and how they are linked to the public opinion’s view on migrants, refugees and minorities. Furthermore some of this debates were essential to secure the win of Law and Justice Party in the 2015s general elections and secure its high poll position until present.

It is obvious that attitudes towards foreigners are shaped by numerous of factors including demographic, economic, cultural, historical political and social indicators. The type of social relations in this area will be decisive to the general social climate for the migrants in particular country and the way they are treated in public sphere and in private relations. As Rajzman and others are commenting, until today nor academics or policy makers have reached a consensus why natives are viewing immigration as threatening and why otherwise similar, but settled in different countries people, tend to vary greatly in their opinions, even

after controlling for socio-economic differences (Raijman et al. 2003). Generally attitudes towards minority groups can be classified into three groups: cognitive (reflecting stereotypes and cultural perceptions), affective (reflecting prejudice), and behavioural (reflecting discrimination and violence or support and acceptance) (Kourilova, 2011). The attitudes to other people varies also by age, gender, education and social status of the person. Individuals with all their personal experiences, personalities and social position are exposed however to cultural and political climate in the local context or nationwide. Markaki and Longhi in their cross-cutting analysis of existing data on attitudes towards immigrants found out also that an increase in the regional unemployment rate of immigrants and the percentage of immigrants born outside the EU are both associated with increased concerns in the population over the impact of immigration on the country. Differences in anti-immigration attitudes across regions in Europe may not be as closely related to the current economic conditions of the region, as they might be driven by concerns over the conditions of the immigrant population in that region, in addition to an overall inflated estimation of the extent of immigration (Markaki and Longhi 2012: 19). This findings are probably the closest explanation how the attitudes of the Polish natives to foreigners were shaped and changed over the years.

In our own work (Bulandra and Kościótek, 2014: 75-76) we have distinguished three particular dimensions that are linked to Polish natives' attitudes to foreigners. First one is social, measured by the level of society openness, its tolerance and direct social contacts. The second one is political, and it is shaped by the type or model of migration policy in its both legal and practical dimension. The third one is the level of obedience to the rule of law and international standards, as well as governmental plans and actions against discrimination, racism and other xenophobic behaviours. While analysing connections between official migration policy and public opinion we have found that institutionalized xenophobia, present on the governmental level, then incorporated into the practical dimension of migration policy and reflected also in the legal system caused the rise of hostile attitudes against migrants in Polish society. Further literature and research review, made for this particular report showed that presently this connection become deeper, causing unprecedented drop in acceptance of foreigners as a social group.

In order to understand however what happened and how it happened we needed to look back into the last two decades of the twentieth century. If we look into the general public consciousness, Polish people at the very symbolic level perceived the nation as tolerant and open to others, referring to the historical perspective, when Poland was very diverse and multicultural country, providing shelter to Jews and other ethnical and religious groups persecuted all over the Europe between fourteenth and eighteenth centuries. This perception is however largely mythological. The openness is more postulated value and present in the attitudes declaratively that was proved by numerous research measuring the level of distance to immigrants in Poland (Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami UW, 2009: 19, 25). In the public poll on the perception of foreigners' it was revealed that there is large discrepancy between acceptances of different nations. The reluctance is more linked to religious and cultural difference than to the nationality. As acceptance of different values and opinions is perceived as better indicator of the openness than acceptance of innate features (nationality) Polish people is scored low in such research (CBOS, 2007, CBOS, 2011: 6). As Nowicka commented this does not refer to race which creates the visible difference. In the view of Polish, Africans as clearly other by appearance were perceived extremely alien and for that reason excluded from the typical social roles, such as partners, colleagues or

blood donors (Nowicka, 2004: 206). For the last decades of twentieth century the Polish attitudes towards migrants had been also driven by the stereotypes linked to West-East division, European community belongings and historical and cultural bias towards Germans, Jews and Roma.

In another public poll we, and Other Space Foundation have ordered in PBS statistical research platform for the first migration forum in Krakow in 2013, it was revealed that two thirds of the locals did not want more migrants in Poland and perceived migration as a threat. Polish people also did not value the positive sides of migration such as alleviating the demographic crisis (62% did not accept this advantage), cultural and social enrichment (60.6%), intellectual contribution to country's development (53.1 %), creation of intercultural families (54.2%). As many as 68.8 percent of Polish people thought that Poland could not afford to provide aid to Africans, Asians and East Europeans, 63.9 percent thought that migrants would endanger the jobs and labour market stability, 55.5 percent perceived migrants as source of conflicts and security threat, 56.7 percent were feared that national unity would be broke (Bulandra and Kościótek, 2014: 79).

This stability of the xenophobic attitudes, resistant to social changes, progressive movements and more intensive contacts with larger numbers of foreigners was explained by Okólski and Grzymała-Kazłowska by reference to mono-ethnicity of the Polish nation after the WW2 and lack of opportunity to engage in social relations with foreigners. This was facilitated by the governmental propaganda exploiting the anti-German resentments, anti-Semitism and unintentionally, anti-Soviet attitudes by forcing the brotherly friendship between socialist countries (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski, 2003: 31-32). As Pilch noted the level of tolerance is a result of the personal awareness, knowledge and set of features connected to the upbringing model. If the knowledge is advanced, person have more information on certain object, then potentially one is more tolerant (Pilch, 2001: 67-70). Unfortunately, Polish schools and education system as general never offered any type of intercultural or civic education. If such classes had been organized it was always local initiative of the teachers and headmasters in certain schools. The tolerance teaching and anti-discrimination education were never part of the school curriculum except the short period between 2015 and 2017, however such recommendation had not been operationalized for certain subjects or workshops to be conducted in the schools. Issue of interculturalism, multiculturalism, anti-racism and xenophobia prevention does not exist as topics in the governmental standards for the education of teachers and their competence elevation (Abramowicz, 2011: 22). The EVS study in 1990 and 1999 showed that the level of xenophobia raised significantly, and Polish people stand out from other European nations in their opinions about migrants' arrival (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2002: 192-194). After the accession to European Union enthusiasm following this event caused a slow but progressive rise in acceptance of migrants in the society. This effect was however smaller than expected which was explained again by type of migration policy (strict and controlling) and concentration of the migrants in larger cities, which led to greater anonymity and melting process within the society (Wencel and Klaus 2010: 58). Some blame could have been ascribed to media, which in the last decade of the twentieth century pictured migrants as intruders, threat to national security or criminals. Most were described as collective group and rare individual stories had negative context (Mrozowski 1997: 7, 35). Migrants had to wait until Polish accession to EU to read or see positive stories in mass media. Threat and problems were replaced then, in the media discourse, by integration issues and success stories. These new narratives helped to build better perception of the foreigners in Poland

but showed also that Polish people's attitudes towards migrants are labile and can be easily influenced by media reports, especially negative ones, describing foreigners as those who stepped against the cultural norms or taboos. The state of art analysis in the period preceding "migration crisis" proved that discrimination and xenophobia were stronger at the symbolic level and got representation in people's behaviours, violence and hate speech. It is important to emphasize, as Nikitorowicz argued, that in multicultural societies conflict is not dependent to the revealed or existing differences but occurring processes of democratization, getting known each other, mutual understanding and dialogue with otherness as condition of one's development. (Nikitorowicz, 2010: 367-368). This process might be interrupted by media propaganda or political statements that inspire hate, racism or xenophobia. This is particularly important in times, when social dialogue in Poland is now undermined by the deep political, social and cultural divisions within the society that started to form yet before the refugee crisis. This division lies between so called liberal and conservative part of the society, where the first one is perceived or self-called as progressive and elite and second one as backward and uneducated. Division is so deep that both groups began to build the identity around those simplifications. This conservative part of the society tend to be more xenophobic as the research showed. There was a strong link identified between symbolic patriotic identity, national martyrdom and lack of acceptance towards foreigners. The strong belief that nation was permanently harmed combined with the fear of eternal enemies led to aversion and distrust against the other (Skarzyńska, 2017:48). With such an attitude cultural integrity and perception of uniqueness support xenophobic beliefs and behaviours leading to opinion that discrimination is rightful, because Polish people are superior to others. This was particularly underlined by one of our experts, who we interviewed, and from her point of view such beliefs became common within Polish society affecting children and undermining the integration process in schools. To exemplify this problem we may recall that for many years Polish was calling Blacks as Negros (murzyn) until Blacks did not become part of the society and opposed to this word. This word had been however perceived as culturally accustomed and opponents of the political correctness refused to follow, with the argumentation that subjective will of the minorities cannot lead to the change of language conventions. Such changes is up to this day perceived by conservatives as cultural war and breach of the freedom of expression (Kasprzak, 2012, Kowalski, 2010: 238-239). Freedom of speech became in Poland one of the major justifications to use hateful expressions against certain social groups including migrants. Such defence of hate speech had been supported both by conservative publicist such as Rafał Ziemkiewicz and later, by politicians, including leader of the current ruling party – Jarosław Kaczyński. This concept was first introduced by Kaczyński in his speech in the "Polish Flag Commemoration Day" on 2nd May of 2016 when he said that "political correctness destroyed the freedom of expression in the West. We will not adopt any laws on hate speech prevention aimed to eliminate this freedom. Poland must remain and will always remain the Isle of freedom." Such political statements always led to acquiescence for the more vulgar and more hateful behaviors, especially in social media (examples will be discussed further on). Cultural integrity however, could not have excused Polish who was creating new insulting names for foreigners, especially Brown people (Indian, Pakistani, Afghani, Arab) such as "ciapak", "ciapaty", "arabus", "szmatogłowy", "pastowaniec",

“muzol”¹⁴ that never existed before in Polish language and culture and was made up by Polish emigration in United Kingdom.

This what happened with Polish discourse on migration issues after 2015 was mostly inspired by the publications in the Polish conservative and right wing press. Between October 2014 and July 2015, INTERKULTURALNI PL Association, in partnership with the Dialog-Pheniben Foundation carried out work on the diagnosis of hate speech, which is present in media discourse and resulting from the opinions of journalists themselves, or as part of reporting on actions and statements made by Polish politicians. Our cross-sectional study at the first part of diagnosis of public hate speech phenomena confirmed a sustainable trend, showing that the highest level of hate speech primarily affects sexual minorities and Jews, and increasingly Muslims, Roma, and uncertain number of individuals, who contributed positively to develop the idea of gender studies or the supporters of such idea. There was also visible decrease in levels of hate speech against black people, as racism slightly changed its character, pointing at people of Asian (Pakistani, Afghani) or Arabic origin, often bound inextricably with the issue of Islamophobia (Bulandra, Kościótek and Zimnoch, 2015:23-48). Our further quantitative research that was conducted on raw material delivered by Press-Service media monitoring group, containing of 26 501 articles had been finished in April, 2015. As a result, three groups were selected, towards which there had been found the highest rate of co-occurrence of expressions characteristic to hateful language within the close range of words, defining social groups covered by the survey. These were sexual minorities, Muslims and Jews. The analysis was performed using statistical software tools, based on computerized analysis of the words and their compounds within tested texts. This study was then followed by the qualitative analysis of the randomly selected press texts. The query performed showed that hate speech in media was governed by certain features like: overrepresentation of certain newspapers in the discourse on migrants, Jews or Muslims, frequent repetition of the names of journalists who were the authors of hateful texts like Rafał Ziemkiewicz, Jan Bodakowski, Stanisław Michalkiewicz, Marian Miszalski, Piotr Zychowicz, Marcin Wolski, Tomasz Sommer, and Piotr Lisiewicz. This showed that phenomenon of hate speech was spreading not because of the universality of its prevalence in the press, but due to relatively small circle of people with certain views, hired by media. Unfortunately those people were enough prominent to inspire outburst of hateful comments, memes, and other creativity in the social media. The link between those two was clear within our analysis as the same arguments that had been sold in the press had been then followed in social media. These, in the reference to migration issues, was mostly based on islamophobia and concentrated around the issues of terrorism, inability of Muslim to assimilate in the Western countries, cultural and religious crusade of the Islam, collapse of the European civilization, crimes committed by people who was perceived as Muslims, or victimization narratives, showing that Muslims are treated better than other groups for the reason of the racism libel threat (Bulandra, Kościótek and Zimnoch, 2015: 90-198). This narrative soon become the mainstream one and was found to be the major cause of the Polish people reluctance to accept any refugee quota in the relocation mechanism, despite


¹⁴ It is very hard to provide English equivalent for such words: „ciapaty” comes from chapati – Indian bread, but in Polish language means also paint chopping, or stained; arabus is equivalent of Arab but with angry emotional stress; szmatogłowy means that someone wears rag in the head, but refers also to indecent people worth nothing, pastowaniec, refers to the wordplay – it has connection to Pakistani, but also shepherd and bootblack; muzol again refers to Muslim but with the angry emotional stress.

the fact, that yet two years earlier (2014-2015) in the public opinions' polls 72 percent of Polish people accepted the necessity to help asylum seekers (CBOS, 2015).

2. Migration issues in public discourse after the "refugee crisis"

Strengthen of anti-immigration attitudes arose not only with so called refugee crisis but also with the shift of power in Poland when liberal, centric government was replaced by populist and conservative government of the Law and Justice party. New government changed its social and cultural narrative, not only by being openly anti-immigrant or migration sceptic, but also by creation of the new type of patriotism – based on anticommunism, cultural integrity, ethnic purity and conservative Catholicism. This new vision of Polish, probably unintentionally incorporated several worst features such as aggressive nationalism or ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants or persons with migration backgrounds. This last category was particularly important in this discourse as searching for the "roots" of people (usually Jewish) to whom hatred comments are directed is one of the most common hate speech patterns in Poland. These waves of anti-Semitism are observed each time some affairs referring to Jewish heritage in Poland or Israeli foreign policy statements are revealed. The recent outburst had been connected to diplomatic conflict with Israel caused by the amendment of the National Institute of Remembrance law in 2018, penalizing the public accusations of Polish involvement in Holocaust. In numerous online comments, articles and public statements Polish Jews suffered from verbalized exclusion processes causing them to fear or feel anxious (Newsweek, 2018). Any kind of the historical problems might create the source of nationalistic conflict. This can be easily applied to Polish-Ukrainian relations, where Wołyń (Volyn) genocide in 1943-1944 and reprisal shortly after the WW2, the historical judgment of Stepan's Bandera heritage had become a seed of discrimination, hate speech and violence in relations between Ukrainian immigrants and some Polish people. These two examples show another characteristics of the Polish hate speech – incitement by the certain events. When Polish 800 meters run athlete was defeated again by Caster Semenya on World Athletics Championships we have witnessed another outburst of homophobic and racial slurs against transgender people, women and Blacks. The ease of the hate incitement among Polish people, especially by media broadcast, caused an unprecedented drop in migrants' perception in Polish society after the Law and Justice came into power. Migrants, asylum seeker and refugees became the first victims of cultural war that government provoked. Between 2015 and 2017 day by day the public television's main news program "Wiadomości" delivered xenophobic and racist stories on these groups of people leading to aforementioned drop in the acceptance of asylum seekers (72 vs. 39%) shown just six month after the previous poll (CBOS, 2016). In this poll only four percent of the respondents allowed acceptance and settlement of the asylum seekers on the territory of Poland. In the most recent study of the European Council on Foreign Relations Polish identified foreigners of three different categories (Muslims, migrants and Russians) as the biggest threat to Europe. In this study the result was distorted by men as for women mostly climate changes and nationalism are the biggest threat for the modern societies.

What is the single biggest threat to Europe today?



Furthermore Polish people are one of the most distrustful nation towards others, open to conspiracy theories, nativism and populism (see table on page 12 from the Ipsos Study on societies political attitudes in different parts of the World in 2019)



Agreement with Statements – Overall Summary

| | Argentina | Australia | Belgium | Brazil | Canada | Chile | France | Germany | Great Britain | Hungary | India | Israel | Italy | Japan | Malaysia | Mexico | Peru | Poland | Russia | Saudi Arabia | Serbia | South Africa | South Korea | Spain | Sweden | Turkey | United States | |
|---|-----------|-----------|---------|--------|--------|-------|--------|---------|---------------|---------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------|--------|------|--------|--------|--------------|--------|--------------|-------------|-------|--------|--------|---------------|-----|
| The System Is Broken | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| [Country's] society is broken | 54% | 74% | 47% | 25% | 78% | 52% | 57% | 46% | 63% | 63% | 66% | 40% | 25% | 34% | 32% | 54% | 61% | 63% | 84% | 64% | 24% | 63% | 78% | 43% | 69% | 49% | 45% | 60% |
| The [Country's] economy is rigged to advantage the rich and powerful | 70% | 76% | 66% | 69% | 75% | 73% | 73% | 69% | 70% | 78% | 69% | 65% | 72% | 66% | 57% | 79% | 78% | 65% | 76% | n/a | 76% | 69% | 72% | 77% | 50% | 66% | 66% | |
| Traditional parties and politicians don't care about people like me | 66% | 74% | 64% | 65% | 72% | 61% | 73% | 60% | 69% | 73% | 68% | 49% | 67% | 48% | 57% | 76% | 75% | 71% | 72% | n/a | 65% | 78% | 64% | 75% | 50% | 60% | 67% | |
| To fix [Country], we need a strong leader willing to break the rules | 49% | 44% | 50% | 65% | 53% | 39% | 42% | 22% | 52% | 35% | 72% | 58% | 62% | 44% | 42% | 41% | 45% | 62% | 50% | n/a | 31% | 51% | 62% | 31% | 36% | 64% | 35% | |
| [Country] needs a strong leader to take the country back from the rich and powerful | 64% | 67% | 67% | 62% | 73% | 67% | 62% | 38% | 70% | 68% | 80% | 66% | 59% | 46% | 68% | 79% | 74% | 57% | 67% | n/a | 57% | 69% | 64% | 67% | 41% | 60% | 66% | |
| Experts in this country don't understand the lives of people like me | 62% | 75% | 63% | 61% | 59% | 62% | 72% | 57% | 67% | 65% | 61% | 40% | 62% | 55% | 56% | 73% | 68% | 66% | 54% | n/a | 58% | 67% | 59% | 71% | 47% | 63% | 65% | |
| Immigrants take important social services away from real [Nationality] | 43% | 49% | 43% | 48% | 37% | 41% | 46% | 45% | 39% | 40% | 49% | 41% | 42% | 25% | 60% | 44% | 50% | 26% | 45% | 38% | 54% | 48% | 32% | 43% | 34% | 67% | 42% | |
| When jobs are scarce, employers should prioritize hiring people of this country over immigrants | 60% | 65% | 53% | 51% | 60% | 50% | 54% | 49% | 48% | 75% | 63% | 69% | 53% | 53% | 81% | 69% | 62% | 65% | 81% | 52% | 82% | 63% | 60% | 52% | 34% | 73% | 55% | |
| [Country] would be better off if we let in all immigrants who wanted to come here | 15% | 17% | 15% | 12% | 19% | 11% | 18% | 8% | 17% | 7% | 35% | 12% | 12% | 11% | 12% | 13% | 22% | 12% | 6% | 27% | 5% | 12% | 9% | 15% | 17% | 14% | 22% | |



It is no surprise however if we analyze the content of national media's broadcast on migrants. Maybe the most meaningful example is the TVP News report on Ramadan (Wiadomości TVP, 2017). In three minutes long video showing different manifestations of the Muslim's presence in Europe, mostly violent and criminal, authors tried to convince that Muslim immigrants are becoming threat for Europe not only as terrorists but also due to assimilation failure. It is clearly emphasized that Muslims are invading Europe. It is all placed in the context of Ramadan – the holy months in Islam that had, in the view of the report authors' quite different face. They convince that during the feast's month radicals became more active committing fifty five terrorist attacks in which more than five hundred people were killed. This information is followed by the "expert" statement who declared that Islamic State leader is promising paradise to martyrs and each infidel killed during Ramadan counts thousand times more in heaven. After this, the collage of "Muslim" crimes are shown, mostly fake ones, like the French comedian performance in alcohol shop, here threatened with full attention. At the end, Muslims dancing on the streets of UK city are shown as the manifestation of the future evil. The commentators are saying that tolerance is understood in the wrong way, blind political correctness created the space for radical Islamists and only bringing back the Christian values might be the rightful cure. Otherwise Europeans will not be hosts in their own homes anymore.

All such reports were made with the same pattern. Xenophobic narration and visions, usually put out of the context are supported by the statements of different experts – usually conservative ones, and those who criticize Islam or migration flows. Then the crimes of migrants are mentioned and the weakness and helplessness of Western politicians in response to radicalization are underlined. Polish opposition is criticized for their will to agree to accept the relocation quotas.

Such ongoing public media propaganda can be linked to unprecedented and never observed before rise of violence against migrants in Poland. Only the official police statistics showed that in 2015 there was 337 hate crimes recorded and yet next year there had been 1635 such crimes. That was only the tip of the iceberg as the media monitoring revealed that over one hundred verbal or physical attacks on foreigners were reported in Polish media daily (Sojda, 2017). Not only were foreigners the victims of the xenophobic violence but also those who helped them or Polish people who spoke loudly other languages. In their aggression offenders often recalls to cultural integrity, demanding the acceptance of so called Polish values or obligation to speak Polish language on the streets. Skarżyńska argues that such effect occurred because both in public media and in official governmental narration there is clear tendency to locate historical accent in martyrdom and in opposition to the neighboring countries (Russia and Germany), but also European Union, that is seen as primary evil. Skarżyńska deducts that nationalist radicalization is connected with the need to improve the self-confidence of the individuals characterized by the low resource of the social capital and with compensation of individual deficits (Skarżyńska, 2017: 48). The sudden rise of nationalistic attitudes and behavior, often symbolically manifested, together with evident drop of acceptance to migration movements is associated with the official governmental propaganda – patriotic on the one hand (getting up from knees ethos) and anti-immigrant on the other. This propaganda is highly xenophobic but spread with parallel assurance of the respect to migrants who work hard, assimilate and accept our cultural values.

As the example of such statement we may refer to the speech of Jarosław Kaczyński who was scaring the voters on the rally in Maków Mazowiecki, with Platforma Obywatelska (Civic

Platform political party) secret pact with EU to accept hundred thousands of Muslims in Poland. According to the politician the right person to answer the question if we shall accept asylum seekers is the Ministry of Health as this is the issue of the health safety. He then referred to the occurrence of highly dangerous diseases, not seen in Europe for the long time. He mentioned cholera on Greek Islands, dysentery in Vienna, different kind of parasites, protozoans that are not dangerous in the bodies of those people but might be dangerous here. He concluded that that it cannot lead to any discrimination however it must be checked. This statement was made just before the election's day in 2015.

In the local election campaign in 2018 the Law and Justice party made also highly xenophobic movie in which natives were threatened that win of the Civic Platform will lead to immigrants ghettos in their cities, spread of violence and terrorism (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2018). In the short video we see the long queues in the border, people in sanitary masks, person kicking someone off the stairs in metro, riots, burning cars, and attack in Nice followed by the opposition's politicians holding banners "Refugees welcome".

On the other hand government on every occasion denies being anti-immigrant, xenophobic or racist. Defending the Polish refusal to accept the asylum seekers quota in 2016 Beata Szydło told in the European Parliament that Poland accepted one million refugees from Ukraine. She referred this way to Ukrainian labour immigrants coming to Poland, but exploited the context of the Donetsk and Crimea wars to convince EU officials that Poland does not avoid its international obligations. In fact in 2015, only two Ukrainian asylum seekers were granted refugee status in Poland. The official governmental narration can be perceived as schizophrenic because other prominent PiS parliamentarian – Dominik Tarczyński in the interview with Cathy Newman for the British Channel 4 told her that Poland as a country is safe because it is not accepting illegal Muslim immigrants. On her question how many asylum seekers Poland let in, he replied "zero" and promised that "not even one Muslim will enter Poland", which obviously does not correspond with any facts (Voice of Europe, 2018). Surprisingly enough, against its own propaganda current government opened the borders for foreigners for the unprecedented scale and this inflow include the foreigners from predominantly Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. This policy is completely contradictory to the official statements as both prime ministers Beata Szydło and Mateusz Morawiecki claimed that Poland will not be accepting immigrants from Middle East and North Africa. The current migration reality is hidden by the government and since the end of 2018 migration agenda again returned on the margin of the political discourse. It was replaced by other evil – the LGBT lobby and organizations. The absence of the migrants in the political agenda in 2019 did not improved their picture in the society's opinion. Polish exceptionalism that is being built on nationalistic beliefs, Slavic heritage and conservative Catholicism was still strong and supported by governmental party politicians, other right-wing parties but also by the conservative bishops in the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Despite ambivalent church position on migrants, where believers are officially encourage by the congregation of bishops to provide aid to asylum seekers and show them compassion, the lower clergy present anti-immigration attitudes and spread them among the faithful (Pędziwiatr, 2018: 462, 469-471). Unfortunately even some prominent catholic figures present racist and supremacist attitudes in their official accounts. The Archbishop of Krakow and Vice President of Polish Episcopate Marek Jędraszewski in his lecture on atheism and relation between faith and science delivered in the Holiest Saint Rosemary Church in Pabianice (Łódź region) he made the following statement: "I can easily imagine, that soon, I hope that I will

personally won't live it, that in 2050 may be, a few Whites will be shown to other human races – here on the European territory – such as Indians are shown in the reserves in the United States. There were such people in the past, who lived here, but extinct on their own wish, because they could not accept who they are biologically" (VOX24.PL, 2019). Such unacceptable comments are often made without any perception of its wrongfulness. They are acceptable as being supportive in cultural war with the left who are associated with gender, LGBT, and migrants. People who does not accept the presence of these groups in the country agree to build alliances with extreme right-wing groups. In their discourse the accusation of fascism is indeed the attack on the traditional values (Ciesek, 2015: 168). Ciesek observes that contemporary public discourse in Poland is being built on the Latin Christian civilization cult. It means the acceptance of norms and rules of the society worked out throughout the centuries both in the public and private, family sphere. The nationalistic discourse, appreciating the significance of the Latin, and particularly Slavic culture, put emphasis on the intellectual achievements: scientific, or technological. The progress that brings development, but with the respect to tradition, and national distinction is appraised as being in the line with the concept of work for the welfare of the homeland. In the symbolic space of ideas and axiology the behavioral patterns of social and cultural life remains unchanged and untouched as part of national and civilizational heritage. This space is closed and heavily protected against any transformations (Ciesek, 2015: 171). Unfortunately the supremacy of the Christian ethos becomes the source of exclusion practices. This ethos is justifying the new government stand on the migration issues. Poland agreed to collaborate with Europe in migration crisis resolution provided it is allowed to choose which migrants deserve to be accepted or relocated to Poland. This was always to be similar people however sameness was defined on very superficial level of religious, ethnical and race kinship. Nevertheless in case of Syria, Poland wanted to limit its commitment to accept refugees who were Christians only.

The conflict around asylum seekers quotas undermined the Polish position in the European Union but led also to the major transformation of the Polish foreign policy. The principle values of the European Union are based on the openness understood as human rights universalism, secularity, individualism, defining national identities in inclusive way (integration of migrants rather than assimilation). Closeness is on the other hand based on the idealization of the nation, preference of the national homogeneity, strong authoritarian ruling, traditionalism, collectivism and distrust to international institutions and capital (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). All those latter features are present in the contemporary public discourse about the Polish presence in the European Union. As Bilewicz notes the polarization between being open and closed is one of the major feature of the political and social reality in Poland. It is almost tribal or sectarian in nature causing clashes and tensions both in the traditional and social media (Bilewicz, 2015). Both groups radicalize and commentators and academics in Poland cannot presently anyhow predict where these division will lead and how to end or at least allay them. What is surprising for the group who oppose the liberal or so called post materialistic values it is still supporting Polish presence in the European Union and the freedom of movement within the Schengen zone. This acceptance is not unconditional as most of the Polish oppose the greater integration and support reforms of the EU that would bring back most competences to nation states (Stokes, 2016). Polish people prefer the subsidiary form of EU involvement and do not accept any instruments that would limit the sovereignty of state, such as euro or common EU military. In this context, surprisingly low number of Poles (21 percent) sees the human rights protection as the priority goal of foreign policy. Such sceptic, generalized attitude to the

human rights construction may explain the moderately hostile attitude to migrants in the present day. The other important factors are: the country homogeneity (lowest rate of foreign inhabitants among EU countries) and traditional conservatism.

3. Representations of migrants in media and social perception.

As it was already discussed migrants and migration issues for many years were not part of any important public discussions. Polish people rarely had an occasion to speak about or read about foreigners. This however changed slightly after the Poland's accession to EU, and quite recently again, after the shift of power in 2015. Since then, the refugee crisis was exploited by the public media and government as element of the petrification of the Law and Justice authority. This narrations was predominantly negative and xenophobic.

Apart from the general opinion polls on the attitudes toward migrants there were not so much publications on how migrants are presented in the press or in the public discourse (Jura, and Kałużyńska, 2013: 7). Grzymała-Kazłowska however formulated five hypotheses that governs drawing the pictures of the migrants in the press and other media. The more migrants arrive there is a rise in the occurrence of this topic in the media. This lead to materialization of the otherness description in the media. It became more complex, multidimensional as the effect of media pluralism. The second hypothesis refers to aforementioned polarization of opinions. In conservative media and tabloids we will find predominant negative descriptions basing on stereotypes while in liberal media narrations will be driven by political correctness and tolerance. The media discourse is more and more systematic and consistent depending of the type of publisher (tabloid or opinion-forming). The way of portraying migrants is also influenced by the Western cultural patterns, norms and dialects. Finally narration will be dominated by cultural stereotypes on certain nations and imaginations of the migrants in similar social and professional roles (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2007). These hypotheses proved to be correct, however it had been recently distorted by the homogenous, and clearly xenophobic discourse present in the public media between 2015-2017. It was also proved that public opinion is manipulated by the media broadcasters and a great number of the migrants' representations are fake or taken out of its context. The reports are increasingly selected to prove certain thesis and are far from objectivity.

In the discussion about the migrants' presence in Poland we may select several patterns. Migrants are perceived as those who are bringing economic benefit or economical threat to the hosting society. Such discussions are focused around issues of unemployment, economic development, civilizational advancement, cultural enrichment. Another representation refers to European integration. Recently there is visible overrepresentation of the terrorism threat in the migration discourse. Media representations of the foreigners in this context caused identification of Muslims only with terrorism by the majority of the Polish (Fundacja Afryka Inaczej, 2015). Another pattern refers to the attitudes of the host society and Polish exclusionism and xenophobia. In these representations Poland shall be inhabited purely by Polish people and foreigners are portrayed as intruders and unwelcomed. The last representation reconsiders the patterns of the migrants' presence in Poland. Most of the papers, articles and reports here argue that for most migrants Poland is just a short stop in their migration experience. Quite different representations could be met in the description of the migration issues in the context of the Western countries. Polish

media refers here to the problem of age progression in the European countries, cultural threat and expansion of Islam, the rise of political radicalism and populism affecting the migrants' treatment or to the humanitarianism. Finally we may find the representations referring to the migrants' countries of origin. These are mostly the individual stories, reports and essays on problems and affairs in such countries, description of conflicts or references to more global problems that are affecting the migration movements.

All those representations are present and reconsidered in the Polish media in four different perspectives. The multicultural one praise the cultural diversity, tries to explain the negative events and integration problems with the use of social exclusion models and generally create positive representations of migrants. It often refers to the activity of non-governmental organizations and social activism. This perspective underlines the importance of the European cooperation and good practices exchange. We may however find also a state perspective where emphasis is given to inability to include migrants in political process unless they assimilate or gain the citizenship. This perspective is linked strictly with the governmental migration policy and present the governmental position on the migration issues. Currently this type of perspective is xenophobic and anti-immigrant. It is supported by the ethno-nationalistic perspective that describe the World as collapsing, mainly due to the invasion of the migrants into the European countries. A dichotomy between natives and foreigners are drawn. Migrants are unwelcome and evil. Some narratives in this perspective allows the possibility to provide institutional, development and humanitarian aid in the countries of origin but only as a tool to stop migration. In this perspective we find overrepresentation of the hate speech and white supremacy, treating migrants from Global South as less developed and uncivilized. The last perspective is the most diverse. It was called by Grzymała-Kazłowska as sensational and deviational. This covers different, usually individual stories from the regions and local communities, where migrants are described in the context of exotics, folklore, family life, crimes and other unspecified representations.

In our own research on hate speech in media that was conducted in 2014 we made a qualitative review of over 350 out of 1914 articles about Muslims present in the Polish press between January and December 2014 (Bulandra, Kościółek and Zimnoch, 2015: 90-115). Furthermore in 2015 we reviewed the raw data again to find out more on the representations of the asylum seekers and the refugees and Roma people in the press that time.

The descriptions of Islam as the religion, political and social system are concentrating around several issues. It is argued that Islam in fact is not a belief but intrusive and authoritarian political system. It is also opposed to Christianity. In the political context of Islam, Muslims are perceived as those who tend to dominate European cultures and transform them according to the rules set by Prophet. The conflict between Christians and Muslims dominated the media discourse in 2014 and referred to social and ethnical relations in Nigeria, Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Iraq and Syria. Christians were described as victims, persecuted and brutally killed by the Muslim radicals. No Muslim victims were frequently present in this discourse. The presence of the Muslims in Europe were almost completely associated with the terrorist threat. Islam, its believers were described in the context of fundamentalism. Moderate Muslims, not mentioning progressive ones were non-existent. The separate group of representations touched the problem of Islamophobia in the Western societies. In Poland press underlined the weakness of the Western reaction to cultural expansion of the Muslims. They convinced that all problems were linked to the political correctness that was placing discrimination in the

fields where it had not been present and allowed Islamic radicals to push the border of the social acceptance to their own cultural and moral values- alien to Western progressive societies. The conservatism of Islam sometimes was seen as an ally in the cultural war with Western moral decay, especially gender ideology, sexual minorities, abortion and euthanasia.

Some part of the reports were devoted to the different conflicts around the World. It is interesting that reports on the Israeli and Palestinian conflict were more Arabic-friendly and if lack of objectivity was at stake, the relation was rather anti-Semitic, not anti-Arabic or anti-Islamic.

In the rare positive representations of the Muslim, Polish press focused on the cultural transformations of the Arab countries, political change and activism connected to Arab Spring and reception of the Western cultural patterns in the Middle East countries. Some articles were showing Islamic culture, discuss the sport, economic or pop culture issues.

The narration on the asylum seekers we have found in the press reports and articles in 2014 were driven either by fear and threat or the compassionate individual stories. The latter ones were however singular. There was a larger concept made up that most of the asylum seekers are in fact economic migrants ready to exploit Western social security systems and live for benefits at host society expense. Furthermore such immigrants, often staying illegally in the host country or being undocumented, which makes impossible to expel them, did not integrate with the locals. Moreover, they forced their customs and culture on unprepared for such invasion and over-tolerant Western societies. In Poland it was much exploited that French, British or German immigrant ghettos are results of migrants' natural-born features and customs, lack of integration will, and are not caused by social exclusion and discrimination practices. If asylum seekers profess Islam they automatically creates a threat to European and Western values. Secularization process in this religion were not observed in the press discourse. Furthermore the Islamic religion is accustomed with every asylum seeker or migrant coming from the Arab or Asian countries with Muslim majority. There are no Muslim converters, apostates or atheists according to Polish press publications. Another sort of articles refers to aid provided for refugees and asylum seekers. It was argued that our society cannot afford acceptance of the larger groups of migrants or provide aid to asylum seekers as we are still unable to resolve country's own poverty problem. Next plot reconsiders terrorist threat connected to asylum seekers influx even though there was no asylum seekers among terrorists that time. Very interesting thread was linked to opinion that only ex-colonial countries should have been responsible for the migration crisis, and they had been obliged to resolve that problem on their own. Some perspectives, not as rare as it could have been expected, are basing on conspiracy theories. In such narrations George Soros and Western elites are responsible for the global migration crises. The aims behind these are very diverse, from economic perspectives to cultural ones, with particular emphasis on NWO theories. Some bizarre representations combined Western left elites (particularly German) with the will to Islamize Europe as part of anti-Christian crusade that was promoting also pedophilia, abortion and homosexuality. In this rhetoric Western left hated Christians as they opposed the progression and transformation of social values.

In the parallel report from the same period (Jura and Kałużyńska, 2013: 14-53) we could found the description of the representations of the Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Vietnamese, Chinese, Chechens, Arabs, Roma, Muslims and Blacks. The results revealed that

Roma, Arabs and Muslims were presented in the clear negative manner, especially in the internet. The research conformed also our own observation that conservative and right-wing media tended to concentrate on certain migration issues and certain nationalities. In the Jura and Kałużyńska research there was overrepresentation of the articles dedicated to our neighbors. Ukrainians were portrayed frequently as nationalists relating to the legacy of Stepan Bandera and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), who inspired and conducted genocide of Polish inhabitants in Volyn region during the WW2. This narratives were negative and hostile. It occurred more often than discourse relating to German Nazism. People were blamed for this historical event, called insensitive to the Polish historical perspective. At the same time those journalists claimed that due to the genocide occurrence Ukrainians did not have any moral right to build their national identity around Bandera and UPA's heritage. As usual, the historical truth and context are not so unequivocal.

Generally the representations of the migrants in the traditional and social media are interconnected. Both Worlds are presently citing each other, however most often the information delivered by the traditional media is repeated in the social media and strengthened by interaction of the commentators. The emotional stress in the internet is much higher and most of representatives are not objective. Social media representations tend to be also more negative and aggressive towards migrants in comparison to the traditional media reports. Fake news are frequent and dominant in social media. Stereotypes and prejudices are exploited becoming the cultural factor in internet broadcasts (memology). The negative representations of migrants in social media are often hardcore. For instance Arabs are portrayed as brutal killers, zoophiles (goatfuckers or sheepfuckers), pedophiles and cowards who use women and children as life-shields.

After the 2015 general elections and takeover of the power by the Law and Justice party government started to use public media to distribute the favorable propaganda in different fields of social and political agenda. As the party came into power using anti-immigrant rhetoric and its opposition to the EU enforced refugees quotas the continuation of anti-immigrant narration in public media become the daily issue between 2015 -2017 when the problem was replaced by the gender, LGBT and sexual education problems. These representations never before were more hostile, xenophobic or racist. The asylum seekers and undocumented migrants were openly presented as terrorists, criminals who persecute natives, people invading culturally the hosting countries, and even as the savage gangs of brutal invaders who attack the border posts in large groups, burn the refugees' camps and incite riots. After the short break between 2018 and 2019 this narrative returned to public television just before the current general elections that will be held on the 13th of October 2019. Again the fear against migrants is used by the government as a tool for reaching their political goals and reelection. Voters are scared that vesting the power to opposition will lead to Islamization of Poland, importing terrorism, destruction of Polish families, homosexual marriages and adoption of children by gays and lesbians. The Ministry of Justice is co-organizing and gives his patronage to the academic conference exploring the connection between migration and crime that is going to be held just four days before Election Day. This all happened despite the fact that unprecedented presence of the migrants in large numbers within the territory of Poland is an effect of the governmental ad hoc migration policy. This migration reality is willingly silenced both by public media and government itself.

The last important indication in the relation to the media representation of migrants is that the certain portrait is dependent not on the individual or group features but are driven

by the particular needs of those in power. Their attitude is strictly instrumental. Whenever necessary, Ukrainians can be named hard workers supporting Polish economy or asylum seekers accepted due to the war situation. This generally leads to conclusion that migrants are not partners of such discourse but become the passive subject of it.

4. Conclusions

The overall political and media discourse on migration in Poland is mixed and complex. The migration problems were never part of the central and most vital problems in political debate. Polish people do not have much interest in foreigners and their problems. In certain periods migration debates are gaining however popularity. This usually accompany general or local elections or certain political events, like EU summits or massive refugee influx. Polish people do not have any solid attitudes toward migrants and are vulnerable to propaganda and manipulations in this regard. The public opinions on migrants fluctuated over the time but the overall output is negative showing the great levels of the xenophobia among Polish people inspired by political and media discourse. This rhetoric is divided between the perspective of openness – friendly towards migrants and closeness – hostile to foreigners. The rise of nationalistic views combined with the official historical narration is supporting isolationists attitudes among natives affecting negatively the integration processes. The deep divisions within the Polish society is not helpful as the polarization is widespread and strengthened by the social media activity and growing frustration among Polish. Migrants are repeatedly excluded, being invisible part of the society, unwelcomed by the larger part of it, instrumentally used and reaped of the rights to be a part of the official discourse. On the other hand there is also large part of the liberal media, liberal politicians and human rights activists that take care and disseminate the positive narrations on migration. This is visible particularly in the local communities where migrants reside. Such support is necessary, justified and enough apparent to provide stability and welfare to arriving migrants. This local perspective is particularly important as it provides an asylum from the national propaganda and hatred present in more symbolic channels of communication.



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SLOVENIA

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This report reviews recent analyses of public attitudes and media discourse towards migration issues in Slovenia. Via secondary analysis of the existing literature, it describes ways of perceiving and representing migrants and refugees from 2014 onward. The main sources for the report are academic articles, analyses of media discourse as well as analyses of public opinion polls and policy briefs based either on national (Slovenian Public Opinion survey) or EU-wide data (European Social Survey and Special Eurobarometer on Integration of Immigrants in the European Union from 2017).

1. Introduction

Contemporary immigration to Slovenia began in the 1950s while being one of the republics of the then Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. The intra-state migration flows in Yugoslavia intensified due to industrialisation and urbanisation processes that

made Slovenia one of the popular destinations for labour migration, particularly from the south-eastern regions (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo) (Klinar 1985; Mežnarić 1986). People migrated to Slovenia due to employment possibilities. Especially in the 1970s, when the Western European states that had been the primary countries of destination for Yugoslav migrants started restricting immigration, a more pronounced migration to Slovenia began. Pointing to the fact that social distance existed between the Slovenians and the immigrants from other Yugoslav republics, Silva Mežnarić argued in her seminal study on migration (1986) that symbolic conflicts that were played out at the level of different languages, cultures and national rituals were in fact tensions created by unequal access to the primary sources of power and control in the society.

People who settled in times of Yugoslavia, and are now for the most part citizens of Slovenia, form sizeable ethnic and religious communities without recognised minority rights. Similar fate beholds a considerable portion of the Roma population, in particular, those who have also been migrating to (or through) Slovenia within the last few decades, yet many remained non-citizens. Historical migration trends have hence significantly affected the contemporary composition of Slovenia's migrant population since the vast majority of migrants still come from Yugoslavia's successor states. The geographical, cultural and linguistic proximity remain decisive factors for former Yugoslav co-nationals to continue migrating to Slovenia despite the substantial change in their status, for they are now mainly considered by the EU as "third-country nationals". Migration from other EU Member States, as well as more distant countries, remained modest until recently. Moreover, Slovenia's migration, citizenship and integration policies reflect the overall state's nationalising tendencies of preferential treatment of ethnic Slovenians, who are granted several legal concessions irrespective of their citizenship (cf. Bajt 2011).

The establishment of an independent state in 1991 did not stop the immigration from other republics, particularly in the early 1990s when many former co-nationals sought refuge from the zones of armed conflict. Refugees fled war-torn Yugoslavia, initially from Croatia, most from Bosnia-Herzegovina and also from Kosovo. Eventually, most of the Croatian refugees were able to return home, but the Bosnian refugees remained in Slovenia for a much longer time, some permanently. Initially, the Slovenians expressed solidarity and humanitarian help for refugees, yet at the same time parts of the new political elite and media constructed them as an economic burden to the new state due to their allegedly too high numbers (Doupona Horvat et al. 1998). Looking for reasons and explanations for these tensions, some researchers argued that these were primarily due to cultural and religious differences since the refugees were in majority Muslims who did not speak Slovenian (Klinar 1993). More importantly, the need for Slovenia's break with the "Balkans" on its road to "Europe" was promoted by politicians and the media. As such, refugees and later immigrants, in general, served as a handy scapegoat, perceived as endangering the Slovenian cultural and ethnic identity (Klinar 1993, cf. Jalušič 2001).

Around the same period, a modest "return migration" could also be noted from abroad, when a small portion of Slovenians decided to come back to the country of their or their parents' birth (Lukšič Hacin 2006). In the recent years, increased shares of migrant workers

came to Slovenia to find employment, mostly filling in positions that habitually remain unattractive to the “native” workforce, thus responding to specific job demands, particularly in lower sectors of the economy (Pajnik and Bajt. 2010, 2011). Again, most of the migrant men and women come to Slovenia from Yugoslavia’s successor states, and they were now treated as “third-country nationals” while before they used to be co-nationals. The issue of migration in public in the first decade of the 21st century was debated primarily in terms of work migration, migrant workers in the construction sector and, later on, also their exploitation.

Since the dissolution and war in former Yugoslavia in 1991–1995, there were three critical periods when the issue of migration became a prominent political and highly debated issue in Slovenia. The literature describes “three migrant crises that affected Slovenia in 1992–1993, 1999–2001, and 2015–2016” (Žagar 2018: 103), which mark the main shifts in attitudes and policies towards migrants and refugees. The first period (1992–1993) was directly connected with the already mentioned arrival of refugees from parts of former Yugoslavia, above all from Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the incoming people were first perceived as former co-citizens in need who deserve protection and shelter. This has changed with time and with the government policies, which—faced with considerable influx of people, which was in numbers exaggerated by politicians and media—gave them only “temporary protection” and not the status of refugees. The political discourse (together with the media) instilled some kind of moral panic by soon appropriating a language of natural disaster while discussing the situation of refugee “crisis”. The metaphors that framed the situation in the time of Yugoslav war—the notions of “wave”, and “tide” of refugees, who allegedly “swamped” Slovenia pervaded the later public language in the periods 1999–2001 and 2015–2016 (ibid., 108). Yet it was not before the second and the third “crisis” that substantially new attitudes in the Slovenian public occurred. Already in 1999–2001, and more in 2015–2016 the process of criminalisation of immigrants was in place and manifestations of othering that were not present before occurred. Immigrants were increasingly seen as potential criminal offenders, while the representations tended to mark them as non-legal or even criminals who were seen as abusing the asylum procedure (requesting asylum while intending to continue their journey further west) (ibid., 105).

2. Main Debates on Migration in the Last Five Years

Despite the two crises before 2014 in Slovenia, the overall political debate has not revolved around the issue of migration. While research has often confirmed stereotypical and exclusionary media reporting about migrants and the topic of migration in Slovenia in general, one visible exception occurred: discoveries of massive exploitation of migrant workers from the other former Yugoslav republics, particularly in the period around 2010–2012, caused a slight shift in public debates and media reporting. A room has been made for discussions on the exploitation of migrant workers, and a positive shift occurred in public perception of migrants, as well as some actions of solidarity.

In fact, migration remained an under-debated theme and for a long time, it was off the political agenda. Before the recession and the global financial crisis, the topic of migration was not a relevant issue in the parliament, in other state institutions and most public policies. However, the anti-migration discourses brought it to the political forefront. This resonated first in a series of anti-migration policies, with the example of the 2009 government decree that limited the employment of “foreigners” and was discriminatory and short-sighted regarding measures for tackling recession. The government responded to populist demands to protect the “domestic” workforce, which were claiming that the employment of “foreign” workforce “weakens the gross domestic product” of Slovenia and “takes the much-needed jobs away from the Slovenian workers” (Bajt and Zdravković 2013).

The “crisis”—a constant feature of the mainstream political discourse after 2008—was joined by the rhetoric of the austerity measures and has additionally resonated in specific anti-immigration policies, such as the banning of visas, tightening of border controls or restricting employment or work for migrants. The emergent migration and integration policies, as well as the broader neoliberal political discourse, were increasingly accompanied by populist rhetoric and nationalist discourses which wanted to keep all “outsiders” in rightless positions, or at least at the outskirts of the public welfare regime (Bajt and Zdravković 2013).

In this context, migration has become one of the most salient topics ever since the so-called “long summer of migration” when the “Balkan route” redirected due to the Hungarian border closing and shifted across Slovenian territory. In September 2015, after Hungary closed its border with Serbia, Slovenia became the main entry point to the EU. During this shift and the consequences that followed, the EU institutions remained passive. Thus, most of the work was done at the national levels (see Kogovšek Šalamon and Šeruga 2018). Policy and legislation changes were fast-changing and seemingly desperate. Border closing, however, did not stop with Hungary—soon, also Croatia, Slovenia and Austria followed the Hungarian example. Slovenia increased the border controls and sought help from the EU, receiving additional law enforcement to be able to combat the increased migration. This was followed by the reintroduction of the border controls despite the Schengen Border Area. Slovenian Alien’s Act was amended in a way that the State could introduce the state of emergency in the case of an increased number of migrants arriving at its borders if the government decided the national security is threatened. The former Prime Minister Miro Cerar declared Slovenia as the “guardian of the Schengen border” and acted accordingly.¹⁵

Despite all the security measures implemented, the states along the Balkan route started creating a corridor for the migrants that was quite open. It could be perceived either as a humanitarian one since it helped the migrants to travel faster and safer or as a convenient one. The states involved were just ensuring they transferred the migrants across their territories as soon as possible and handed them to another state.

¹⁵ <https://www.rtvsllo.si/slovenija/cerar-slovenija-je-varuh-schengenske-meje/374419>

Nevertheless, that made the migration seem like a passing phenomenon in transit. Migrants perceived those states as transit countries where they would not apply for the asylum, and the states regarded migrants as some people that need to be transited across their territories as soon as possible. Such response can be described as an exceptional situation that, in fact, contravened the rule of law (Kogovšek Šalomon and Šeruga 2018). After other EU Member States started limiting the number of migrants they could receive, the corridor and the whole Balkan route started shutting down. At first, the corridor was limited only to Afghans, Syrians and Iraqis in November 2015. Four months later, it closed for everyone (Lunaček Brumen and Meh 2016).

After the closing of the corridor, the situation stagnated. Migrants were stranded along the route, mostly in detention facilities either in the states or at the borders, both physically and administratively through their asylum application procedures. Migration was framed in the first line as a security issue, considering that the police and law enforcement were the main actors dealing with the migrants, and the fact that the majority of migrants were held in some kind of detention facilities.

Before Slovenia was faced with an increased arrival of migrants, the debates on migration that followed the war in Syria and conflicts in some other countries were focused on other issues. Media reported on how people were losing lives in the Mediterranean, while the whole debate mirrored a more humanitarian attitude to the issue. In 2015, Slovenia became one of the main transit countries, and the focus generally shifted towards security and restriction. Media reports and discussions importantly shaped the public opinion and also political debates, policy shifts and legislation changes (Vorgrinc and Smrdelj 2019). The discussion was immediately focused on migration as the central *crisis*. As such, it implied that migration is something that needs to be managed, limited, contained and kept away to preserve safety, well-being and even the whole existence of the native population and the country (Provera 2015). The very term “crisis” implied that one had to deal with emergency, unpredictability and potential danger. The responses must have dealt then with the potential threats.

Media reporting mirrored a new classification of the groups of people that arrived in or crossed Slovenia. Categorisation and classification occurred using labels that constructed hierarchy among the people on the move. There seem to be apparent differences between refugees and asylum seekers, and migrants, economic migrants and/or “illegal” migrants (also often called *prebežnik*, which would translate literally as someone who is “fleeing over”—without particular destination, and bears a negative connotation—see more on this in Žagar 2018: 113). While the refugees (and asylum seekers) were seen as legitimate, those that should be tolerated and deserve compassion and acceptance because they are “truly” persecuted, and in danger, others were labelled as merely “migrants” meaning “economic” migrants that are about to “steal” the jobs, use the taxpayers money and receive social benefits that they were not entitled to receive. The “illegal” migrants were framed as those that definitely do not deserve to integrate since they had broken laws to reach the territory. Thus, even their stories and arguments for it are irrelevant. They were perceived as the biggest disturbance to the security of the State and its peace. The established categories were, however, highly complex and volatile, meaning that one person’s status could have

easily changed in space and time. In media reports and public discourse, the terms were used interchangeably without proper definition and explanation.

While the main framings in the debate were anti-immigrant, which, going to the extreme, sounded like “Let’s stop the migrants and Islam!” there were also other framings, though minor, less visible and heard, such as “Refugees welcome!” (see Zavrtnik et al. 2017: 858).

3. Shifts in Public Attitudes towards Migration Issues

The general public perception of migrants and migration is on the one hand affected by the media and by the Slovenia’s history on the migration from the former Yugoslav republics, which might not be necessarily positive. The main issue in public opinion seems to have economic roots. As Zavrtnik Zimic (2011) suggests, the general opinion on migration in Slovenia heavily depends on the geographical and socio-economic background the migrants come from. The general sentiment is more negative when migrants come from economically weaker and culturally different settings. These migrants are not only a threat to the national economy but also a threat to the very culture and values of the nation. To the contrary, Zavrtnik Zimic (2011) points out that the need to limit migration is not present when it comes to European migrants that could potentially benefit the economy and enrich society. To a certain extent, this reflects the general European attitude also reflected in the policies and strategies. Those deal with “migration” when it comes to unwanted, unskilled migrants, and much more positively connoted “mobility” when it comes to highly skilled migrants. As Fekete (2001) concludes, skill pool is the key to maintaining economic dominance.

In accordance with this, public opinion also depends on the economic prosperity of the State. In times of economic crises, migrants are a convenient scapegoat. They are used by media and politicians in extremely trivialised discussions to present them as a threat to the economy, offering the strategy to limit and regulate migration as a solution to economic crisis (Zavrtnik Zimic 2011). This negative attitude remained in Slovenia even after the number of migrants coming to the country after 2015 dropped, and shifted to some extent to other social minorities. As Lukšič Hacin (2018) points out, the maintenance and strengthening of this hateful discourse was also taken over by the politicians: “unfortunately not only those on the right side of the political spectrum, the parties of the so-called left also did not stand up publicly, decisively and efficiently against the overt or covert racism that has been spreading in the last few months all over Europe, including Slovenia” (ibid.: 57).

Putting the whole migration phenomenon into an almost exclusively economic framework allows the classification of migrants mentioned above. As argued by Zavrtnik and others (2017, 871), public opinion rather directly reflects the previous political and legal definitions and categorisations of migrants than vice versa. The Slovene public opinion thus strictly differentiates between “legal” and “illegal” migrants, and (such as the

EU and national integration policy framework) the majority see only those immigrants who are legally present as deserving integration and supporting mechanisms and policies.


Lukšič Hacin (2018) discusses the demonization of migrants—the group of labour migrants was labelled as migrants, and thus the artificial divide between the refugees and migrants was made. The term “migrant” which represents a general category was occupied by a particular notion of “economic migrant” bearing a highly negative meaning, implying that the reason for migrating is pure greed, and calculation (Jalušič 2017). “Migrants” mix with the refugees and exploit the international rules for protecting their vulnerable status to reach their aim (Lukšič Hacin 2018). This negative portrayal and use of specific terms are reflected in public opinion. As statistics indicate, Slovenian society sharply distinguishes between “legal” and “illegal” migrants (Zavratnik, Zorman and Broder 2017). It strongly opposes “illegal” migrants, while the sentiment is not that negative when it comes to “legal” migrants—meaning above all refugees. If a person has the status of a refugee, the public opinion is open even to the family reunification. As Zavratnik, Zorman and Broder (2017) also point out, this acceptance of “legal” migrants with statuses and rejection of “illegal” migrants also shows a demand for migration to be regulated. The person has to present evidence and legitimise themselves as migrants to migrate (ibid.: 871).

Therefore, the use of concepts and categorisations in public, i.e. legal and political discourse strongly affects public opinion. The fact that public supports migration and shows positive attitude towards it more in the times when the incoming numbers of migrants are low also indicates the influence of the instigated moral panic on the perceptions of majority population. As soon as the number increases and as soon as the media and politicians start raising concerns about the migration, the adverse effects and the threat they potentially bear, the public opinion shifts and expresses lower support. Such shift occurred both in the times of the migrant “crises” in Slovenia in 2000–2001 and in 2016 (Zavratnik, Zorman, Broder 2018).

Picture 1: How many immigrants from the countries outside of Europe should Slovenia allow to come?¹⁶



¹⁶ Source: European Social Survey 2002–2016.



The same results were presented by numerous studies and once again highlight the vital role of the media framing in forming public attitudes towards migration, as Dennison and Dražanová (2018) conclude in their research. They also emphasise that the general sentiment towards migration is rather stable and is not, in fact, becoming more negative—it is the importance of the migration as an issue that has gained prominence. Such shift toward negative sentiment creates a climate in which the anti-immigration political parties benefit and become more popular since they are addressing the migration issue. This leads to a belief that the states and the whole EU are not doing enough to control the external borders and present that as an issue. Although according to the study results, the majority of people does not have very strong feelings towards migrants, they are forced to choose since they are faced with the polarised public discourse (Dennison and Dražanová 2018: 10–11).


4. Attitudes toward the Integration of Immigrants in Slovenia

It is, therefore, interesting that the results of the 2017 European Barometer suggest that the perception of a positive or negative impact of immigrants on society seems to correlate with the actual share of immigrants in a country's total population and that the higher the actual share, the more positive impact is noticed, and vice versa, the lower, the more negative impact is perceived (European Commission 2018: 10). Moreover, in many EU Member States, a perception of the higher percentage of immigrants exists than the factual numbers are. Many Europeans seem to greatly overestimate the number of immigrants in their countries: the proportion of immigrants is overstated by 2.3 to 1 in the average. In Slovakia, this ratio is the highest: 14 to 1. In Slovenia, the ratio is the same as the EU average—2.3. Importantly, the respondents with lower levels of education tend to give higher estimates of the proportion of immigrants in their country. Moreover, similar misconceptions exist vis-à-vis the number of irregular immigrants (ibid., 162).

In 15 of the 28 EU Member States, less than half of those polled think that limited interactions between immigrants and citizens are not a significant obstacle to integration,

with an unusually low proportion of respondents in Slovenia (28%).¹⁷ In 21 Member States, at least one in ten (10%) of respondents think that negative portrayals of immigrants in the media are unlikely to be an obstacle to integration at all, while in Slovenia a particularly large percentage of respondents (22%) think so. In Slovenia, only 33% of respondents have a total positive perception of the impact of immigrants on the society and 29% total negative, while in Sweden 76% have a total positive perception of immigrant’s impact. More than a half (51%) respondents in Slovenia think that immigrants enrich the cultural aspect of life and 55% that fostering the integration of immigrants is a long term benefit for the country (compared with 91% in Sweden and 41% in Hungary). 65% respondents in Slovenia think that immigrants are a burden to the welfare system and 57% that they worsen the crime problems (in Luxembourg 27% think of immigrants as a burden and 34% that they worsen crime problems). Almost one fifth (or 19%) of respondents in Slovenia believe that discrimination is not an obstacle in the process of integration at all (in Portugal only 4%). 16% think that difficulties in accessing long term residence permits are not at all hampering migrants to integrate, and only 31% of those interviewed in Slovenia believe that limited access to education, healthcare and social protection presents major obstacle to the successful integration of immigrants (in Portugal 71%). Yet in contrast to some other countries with more positive perception of immigrant integration, in Slovenia not that many respondents (66%) believe that being able to speak the country language is very important for immigrants (in the Netherlands 87%, in Poland 44%). While one would expect that in Slovenia there would be a high percentage of respondents claiming that the immigrants must be committed to “our way of life” this is in fact not so: only 56% believe so which is low if compared to the Netherlands (79%), while Poland has even lower percentage (31%).

Picture 2: Importance of policies concerning integration in Slovenia



¹⁷ All data is from Special Eurobarometer 469. Integration of immigrants in the European Union (European Commission 2018).

Source: European Commission 2018a (Special Eurobarometer 469, Slovenia Country Factsheet)

5. Representations of Migrants and Refugees

In the last five years, migrants in Slovenia were mainly identified with the category of the “third-country nationals” and mostly portrayed as being entirely different, as having different values, culture, behaviour, even diseases, all of those that are not in accordance with their European counterparts—migrants are just not a part of “us”. Especially after the 2015 Paris terrorist attack, the media reports became more negative (Šulc 2017). Cohen (2002, cited in Šulc 2017: 16) highlights that when a particular event is presented to a bigger extent and as highly relevant that can cause a state of moral panic. He defines moral panic through five elements: 1. raising concerns about a potential or imaginary threat, 2. moral hatred towards those responsible for the threat, 3. social consensus of acknowledgement of the problem and the fact that something has to be done, 4. exaggerating the scope of the event, 5. suddenness of the development of moral panic. He identifies mass media as a particularly important factor in creating this state of panic (ibid.).

This state of panic is further strengthened by describing the phenomenon of migration as “flood”, “wave”, “stream”, “river”, “invasion”, “swarm”, “tsunami”—all implying something threatening, unstoppable, impossible to control and as something that we need to protect ourselves from.

Negative stereotypes were being constructed through reporting on the mistakes migrants make, deviant behaviour, or acts against the law. The latter strongly connects them to criminality, portraying them as a threat. Besides, they are shown as someone taking advantage of the tax money, not working, and bearing all the negative traits (Šulc 2017: 17). As already mentioned, the most visible is the division in those who are the “real” migrants and therefore entitled to our compassion, and the “fake” migrants that need to be removed.

Šulc (2017) analysed the national television news broadcast from October 2015 to March 2016. They reported on migration more heavily when the route shifted towards Slovenia after Hungary closed its border with Serbia, and after the 2015 terrorist attack in Paris. In the analysed period, the reporters mostly used the word “refugees” to describe the migrants.

When portraying migrants, there were some occasions in which the aim was to invoke compassion (emphasising that there are vulnerable groups *among* migrants, such as families or children; stories about violence). Some reports were emphasising the security aspect or reporting on misbehaviour or dissatisfaction by migrants who are seen as something that should not really exist; stressing that the majority of the migrants are men. The news programme on the Slovene national television and the second biggest daily newspaper *Dnevnik* did not report on the migration as opinionated as some other television programmes or newspapers, but by their lack of discussion of implementation of new

policies and legislation that led to further securitisation and militarisation, they contributed to the legitimisation of those practices.

The national television also contributed to portraying the migrants as a threat by reporting on the misbehaviours and conflicts that arose among migrants. In the news, more space was given to right-wing politicians than left-wing ones. There were mostly politicians speaking and sharing their opinions and strategies—migrants were not given a voice in Slovene media in general. They were presented as a third person, as “They”, presented as statistics, a mob without the voice and opinion (see Šulc 2017, Vogrinc and Smrdelj 2019).

On some occasions, migrants were portrayed in a way to invoke compassion, emphasising the existence of vulnerable groups *among* migrants, such as families or children, or the stories about violence and horrors they have faced were shared. On other occasions, the reports were emphasising the security aspect or reporting on misbehaviour or dissatisfaction expressed by the groups of migrants seen as something that should not really exist. In some reports, the focus was on the villagers experiencing anxiety, instead of migrants swimming across the Kolpa river (border river between Croatia and Slovenia) in winter. As Vogrinc and Smrdelj (2019) point out, this made possible for the viewers to identify with the only two options presented—either with people afraid of migrants or the law enforcement as guardians of the national safety (ibid.: 13).

Portraying migrants either as a humanitarian or a security issue share a common characteristic—it takes away the opportunity for migrants to express themselves as political subjects, demanding their rights (Vogrinc and Smrdelj 2019: 14). By not being able to see or hear the migrants, but constantly seeing and hearing the news about their crimes and deviant behaviour, only normalises the criminalisation, hence making it easier to legitimise prosecution against them (ibid.: 16).

An important issue was also the media emphasising that the majority of the migrants are men and presenting that as an additional threat—they threaten not only the economy and security, as they might be terrorists, but they also represent a threat to *our* women. As Zavratnik, Zorman and Broder (2017) highlight, the image of a refugee is highly feminised, and hence they are also de-subjectivised, meaning that any deviance from the passivity “norm” questions the legitimacy of the status of a victim. Young male refugees are thus silenced, perceived as “only” economic migrant, even cowards for not staying and defending their family and country. Women and children are portrayed as the only vulnerable groups that are righteous refugees (ibid.: 863).

When reporting, the lack of space for discussion about implementation of new policies and legislation can also lead to further securitisation and militarisation, thus contributing to the legitimisation of those practices. One of the crucial issues is which politicians get more space in the discussions. In political debates, focusing only on one issue can be a successful strategy to communicate with the public, deliver the political message without having to address any other questions, and gain votes. This was the case in the election campaign debates before the 2018 parliamentary elections. Luthar (2017) also points out that the “distribution of the discursive resources” was unproportionately in favour of politicians in

general (ibid., 156). This importantly affected the perception of the issue and presented only one fragment of the perspectives and views.

Another thing that importantly affected the public perception and discussion was the fact that the sources and channels through which the information was shared shifted from traditional media (newspaper, radio, television) to the Internet and the new media—social media. Social media was particularly vulnerable to hate speech and the portraying of migrants that were directly criminalised most often occurred there (see Bajt 2018). As Žagar (2018) warns, there is no demand for professional ethics online: “[E]verybody can be a journalist and editor on Facebook or Twitter if they want to” (ibid., 120–121). Žagar (2018) marks the post by a Slovene journalist and a member of a right-wing party, Sebastjan Erlah, as a trigger for the virtual pogrom against migrants that escalated online in 2015. The English translation of the post is: “Don’t let them come closer than 500m to the border. If they come closer, shoot everybody, God will recognise his own! Europe can easily solve immigrant crisis. With bullets.” (Žagar 2018: 122).

Such calls for the killing of refugees are an extreme form of hate speech which should be not only immediately, explicitly, and publicly rejected as inadmissible (Bajt 2018: 150) but also criminally sanctioned. Yet past actions of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Slovenia have shown a maximum tolerance toward hate speech, both in the classical and on-line media (ibid.). The above cited and other similar expressions, which represented the peak of hate speech in the refugee crisis in Slovenia were not sanctioned and outlawed until the recent (2019) decision of the Supreme court in the case of similar hateful expressions towards the members of the Roma minority.

6. Debate and Conclusions

Central debates about the migration in the last five years were framed particularly in terms of *a crisis*: they pointed to migration as a crisis that needs to be managed, while the so-called migration “flow” should be limited, contained and kept away to preserve safety, well-being and the whole culture of the reception state. A strong security discourse emerged. Immigration was presented as a main national security issue, which affected both public opinion and policy and legislation changes. Moral panic was instigated by several actors, from political and government to various media.

A general shift in political debate and media coverage took place. Before the increased arrival of migrants to Slovenia in 2015, migration only twice became an outstanding political issue (in 1992–1993 and 1999–2001), and both occasions influenced the time of 2015 and later. Short before 2015, the media mainly reported about the accidents in the Mediterranean, and the discourse was kept in the framework of a humanitarian crisis, presenting people dying in the Mediterranean. When migrants reached Slovenia, the discourse shifted towards security and the potential threats they were supposed to represent.

The differentiated use of terms and categorisations, which classify migrants and create a hierarchy among them was put in place. Apart from the labels such as migrant, refugee and asylum seeker, the term of illegal migrant and economic migrant was used. The invented new term *prebežnik* was used—which can be understood as an informal term for migrants, mostly irregular ones (see above).

Shifts in public attitudes towards migration issues were influenced by both political, legal and media discourse. These attitudes were importantly linked to the history of migration to Slovenia and attitudes to migrants and their experiences in this former Yugoslav republic. Strong feelings about migrants and migration in general accumulated in times that were perceived as crises: after the war in the former Yugoslav republics in the 1990s, between 2000 and 2001, and in 2015. While on the one hand the hateful attitude to the influx sounded like “Let’s stop the migrants and Islam!” there were also other wordings though minor, less visible and heard, such as “Refugees welcome!”

The framing of the increase in migration as “crisis” thus greatly affected **the public perception of migration and migrants**: they were seen as less and less welcome. Negative responses to migrants have also risen as they legally fell into the category of rightless persons. Securitisation of migration, which was more visible in the states on the periphery of the Schengen area, also shifted the framing of public attitudes from humanitarian view and compassion attitude via economic and social calculation and scapegoating (migrants as burden for our social security) to criminalisation framework. At the same time, Slovenia was perceived as the (unwilling) guardian of the Schengen area, pushed into that function by the EU.

Significantly, the perception of the share of immigrants present in the state (both regular and irregular) was exaggerated more than twofold the factual number while integration was seen as preserved for those who “deserved it” and were “legitimately” present in the state (or, in other words, had the status, which does not differ from the formal EU framework). While Slovenian employers in the recent time became aware of the necessity of foreign labour in several sectors, the opposition to migration and migrants—as shown by several recent EU public opinion analyses—emerges mainly while political players talk about migration *en général*, which is typical for the populist misuse of migration issues for various other political goals.

Immigrants were portrayed by different languages in various ways. They were pictured as victims without a voice, and anything outside this category was considered as a threat (e.g. children and women vs. young economic migrants that threaten our economy, women and national security). Increasingly, open hate speech was used to ideas of the vast gap between a refugee, and economic migrant was drawn: the former was perceived as a legitimate, legal migrant, and the latter as illegal, unjustified migrant. There were, however, also other depictions of individual immigrants who stood out in media as “good examples” of adaptable and legitimate migrants—hard-working, fast-integrating, and contributing to the Slovene society.

One of the central insights of this report is the fact that the gap between the public opinion/attitudes and policies that are formulated at both the EU and the nation-state levels shows that it is not the public opinion which in the first place influences the public policies but that rather the established legal and policy framework strongly influences the way how the majority of population understands the rights and position of immigrants vis-à-vis their prospects of integration. It is therefore not the public opinion, which in the first place influences political decisions in reception communities but rather vice versa.



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SPAIN

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In this report we focus on three main categories in the Spanish national sphere related to immigration, migrants and integration: a) Public opinion, looking mainly at the *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS) -Centre for Sociological Research- national survey on Attitudes towards immigration; b) Media discourse, mainly in television, radio and newspapers, based on a review of discourse studies research that have analysed these topics; and c) Political discourse, understood as the discourse of politicians and political parties.

We first report the results in a descriptive way organized according to the topic of interest described previously. In the section on Debates and Discussions, three research questions are addressed based on the documents review: What changes are observed in public attitudes towards immigration issues in recent times? What representations of

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migration, migrants and refugees are noted according to the research published in the period 2014-2019? What are the main debates on migration that are highlighted?

The sources about political and media discourse have been obtained following some principles of the Rapid Review (Khangura, Polisena, Clifford, Farrah, & Kamel, 2014). These principles have been adapted to a process of collaborative review and within the framework of social science research and the research interests of the MiCreate project.

Our search strategy considered three academic databases, Google Scholar, Bun UAM and Scopus, searching with the keywords (media discourse and political discourse) in the title or abstract. The search was carried out in English, Spanish and Catalan. The selection criteria used were as follows:

- That directly refer to the issue of media discourse or political discourse.
- The geographical scope of the analysis should be Spain.
- That the type of text is a publication in a scientific journal, doctoral thesis or document from an organisation with recognised legal personality.
- Publication period from 2014 to 2019.

The initial extraction of information focused on reading the title and abstract. After the extraction phase we selected 79 texts accordingly to the defined criteria. Subsequently, 79 texts were fully read collaboratively by the research team, the same criteria were re-applied, and 27 documents were finally used for this report.

1. Changing of public attitudes about immigration in Spain

The annual surveys carried out by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) - Centre for Sociological Research, allow longitudinal monitoring of public opinion in Spain concerning the migratory phenomenon. Prior to the economic crisis, 2010-2012, Cea D'Ancona, Valles-Martínez, & Eserverri-Mayer (2014) interpreted from available data an increase in the symbolic and cultural racism, especially in Islamophobia issues.

According to Cea D'Ancona (2015), who analyzed the variations of public perception and opinions in the OBERAXE-CIS surveys on attitudes towards immigration, the advance of the economic crisis that triggered a context of budget adjustments and rising unemployment, increased xenophobia in the early years of the crisis. This would be explained by the greater competition for employment and access to social benefits. According to the survey data analysed, they also pointed out that "enjoying a good working and economic position favours tolerance, while the opposite leads to rejection" (Cea D'Ancona, 2015, p. 33). The socio-economic factor seems to have an important influence as a factor affecting public attitudes towards immigration issues in Spain.

The Centre for Sociological Research of Spain carries out an annual study based on

surveys on Attitudes towards immigration. One of the questions in this study provides us with relevant information to assess the variation of perception about immigration over time in terms of positive or negative categories: "In general terms, do you think that immigration is very positive, positive, negative or very negative for this country?". The data of responses for the period between 2008 and 2017 are shown in Table 1.


Table 1. Perception of immigration in Spain.

| | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 |
|-------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Very positive | 3,9 | 3,2 | 2,5 | 2,5 | 3,3 | 4 | 3,7 | 5,2 | 5,3 |
| Positive | 41,7 | 37,6 | 37,8 | 37,5 | 36,3 | 38,2 | 40,1 | 46,5 | 46,3 |
| Negative | 26,1 | 29,4 | 28,7 | 30,4 | 28,8 | 28,3 | 24,5 | 20,2 | 20,9 |
| Very negative | 4,8 | 6 | 7 | 7,9 | 5,7 | 6,2 | 5,1 | 4,3 | 5 |
| Neither positive nor negative | 18,2 | 19,1 | 18,8 | 17,4 | 21,5 | 19,1 | 22 | 19 | 18,1 |
| Doesn't know | 4,5 | 3,9 | 4,1 | 3,7 | 3,9 | 3,8 | 4,1 | 4,5 | 4,1 |
| No answer | 0,8 | 0,8 | 1,1 | 0,7 | 0,6 | 0,4 | 0,5 | 0,2 | 0,3 |
| (N) | 2768 | 2836 | 2800 | 2838 | 2464 | 2477 | 2470 | 2460 | 2455 |

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS).

The results of this survey show that immigration had a mostly positive assessment during 2008-2017, which has ranged from a minimum of 36.3% in 2012 to a maximum of 46.5% in 2016. The data also show that a significant percentage of the population considers immigration to be negative (minimum of 20.2% and maximum of 30.4%) or very negative for Spain (minimum of 4.3% and maximum of 7.9%). The evolutions of these values can be seen in chart 1.

Chart 1. Perception of immigration in Spain.



Source: CIS (2019).

If we look in depth at the results of the national study carried out by the CIS in September 2017 on Attitudes towards immigration, in which 2,455 people were surveyed, we find that 19.7% of those interviewed thought that the group of immigrants receives a great deal of protection from the State and 33.7% consider the protection offered to them to be quite adequate. This percentage is much higher than for other social groups that appeared in the survey (unemployed, elderly people living alone, pensioners), for which only between 1% and 1.5% considered the protection they receive to be very high.

Another relevant question asked in the survey was What issues is immigration associated with? The data showed that 28.7% of participants associate immigration with the need to come to work, this being the most common choice among those interviewed, 17.6% of them associate it with a feeling of empathy and solidarity and 17.2% with poverty and inequality. Directly negative considerations were minor: 4.3% of those interviewed associated immigration with delinquency and insecurity, 3.1% with problems of integration and coexistence and 3.3% made generic references to immigration as a problem.

Regarding the administrative situation of immigrants already residing in Spain, 39.5% of participants considered that only those currently employed should be regularised, regardless of how long they have been in Spain. 20.7% considered that only those who have been living in Spain for several years should be legalised, whether or not they have a job, and 18.5% of them thought that everyone should be regularised, regardless of their situation. 9.9% of those interviewed considered that they should be expelled to their countries of origin.

In terms of public opinion, 60.1% of those interviewed stated that they had not heard any comments against immigrants in recent weeks, while 38.9% indicated that they had heard them. Regarding the media, 37.5% consider that the image transmitted of immigrants was quite negative.

2. Representations on immigration and migrants in the media in Spain

After almost 35 years of research, in the western world, almost all newspapers, from any political orientation, present immigrants and minorities as different, invaders and a threat, promoting a negative coverage of them (Van Dijk, 2015). The Spanish media often associate migrant collectives or immigration with a lexicon of unfavourable meaning belonging to the military semantic field (Alcaraz-Marmol & Soto, 2016; Ruiz-Aranguren & Cantalapiedra-González, 2018), contributing to the creation of prejudices that associate immigration with the idea of invasion and conquest and other negative words. For example In the case of inmigración, some researchers found in a semantic research "62 words with a negative meaning, namely batalla (battle), crisis (crisis), explotación (exploitation), guerra (war), hostilidad (hostility), problema (problem) or preocupación (worry)" (Alcaraz-Marmol & Soto, 2016, p.156). Piquer-Martí (2015) states that in general "we find a representation of the immigrant in a culturalist, differentialist and miserabilist approach" (p.141).

The way in which immigration is treated is usually represented by zoomorphic metaphors, such as birds alluding to movements, phytomorphic, such as trees alluding to roots and uprooting, metaphors of the semantic field of water as "currents, torrents, avalanches", or of the semantic field of war as invasion, conquest (Santamaría, 2002, cited by Susana-Creus, 2012).

According to Chakour and Portillo (2018), while in the Spanish language definition of 'immigrant' refers to leave one place to settle temporarily or permanently to another and it could include pensioners, footballers, students, workers searching for better conditions, the reality is that 'immigrant' word is mainly associated with people that come to Spain from the so-called third world countries.

Despite the production of professional ethical codes and writing style manuals, which aim to avoid stereotyped and superficial visions, discriminatory, racist and xenophobic practices continue to be observed in the Spanish media (González-Cortés, Sierra-Caballero & Benítez-Eyzaguirre, 2014). As they have investigated through interviews with communication professionals, the biggest difficulties in incorporating these professional ethical codes and writing style in the professionals' practice are the enormous speed with which news is published, which decreases the time available for reflection (González-Cortés, Sierra-Caballero & Benítez-Eyzaguirre, 2014).

From an analysis of the media sphere based on interviews with communication

professionals from the Basque Country, Ruiz-Aranguren and Cantalapiedra-González (2018) have highlighted the lack of a specific and systematic communicative strategy when reporting on immigration. For these authors, work routines and latent racism are some of the factors behind the negative informative treatment of immigration.

The vision that both Basque institutions and the media have of migratory processes correspond to a utilitarian vision of migration based on the benefits it brings to the host society, they legitimate it on the fact that the Basques also emigrated at some time. The authors criticize that the debates on security involving migrants are focus on inclusion or not of the word 'migrant' without considering a broader analytical framework (Ruiz-Aranguren and Cantalapiedra-González, 2018).

For Fajardo-Fernández & Soriano-Miras (2016) the construction of the media discourse on immigration in the Mediterranean reproduces the logic of the externalisation of borders and irregular migration status introduced by the European Union's migration policy. According to their analysis, migrant collectives are portrayed "in most cases as passive agents, as victims of the mafias or as objects of assistance [...] and as actors who make use of violence to achieve their purpose" (Fajardo-Fernández & Soriano-Miras, 2016, p. 142). The narrative constructs a de-citizenized and borderalized migrant subject, silencing the problematization of free circulation, human rights, the problems of the countries of origin and the conditions of transit at the borders (Fajardo-Fernández & Soriano-Miras, 2016).

Some authors specifically study the representation of Arab and Muslim migrants in the mass media. In the first place, the use of the term Arab and Muslim (Piquer-Martí, 2015; Fernández & Corral, 2016) is observed as synonyms, which entails a Muslimisation of the Arab and an invisibilisation of secularity visions in this culture. In two Spanish newspapers of national circulation, Piquer-Martí (2015) observed an islamophobic tendency, because the thematic selection had almost always negative connotations and the virtues or successes were silenced. The main themes presented in the media analysed by the author have been integration and conflict.

The analysis of the Maghrebi representations on a corpus of national and regional newspapers in Spain carried out by Fernández & Corral (2016) showed that this group, which has a majority presence in Spain, is generally linked "to issues such as coexistence and interculturality (25.9%), delinquency, conflicts or events (22.2%), demography and migratory movements (16.5%) and other cultural, folkloric or religious issues (10.7%). These aspects, together with labour and socio-economic issues (9.4 %) make up almost 85 % of the subjects we intended to measure" (p.85).

Martínez Lirola and Olmos Alcaraz (2015) have studied the modes of representation of immigrant minors and women on public radio and television in Andalusia. According to these authors, in the radio news analyzed in which men and women are protagonists, they are linked to negative content "in 84.84% of cases. Another characteristic that stands out in this corpus is that the voices of immigrants do not appear in them (only in one case), while the voices of people from the majority group do appear, that is, from the Spanish population"

(Martínez-Lirola & Olmos-Alcaraz, 2015, p.7). They also pointed out that in the corpus of radio news analysed, men and women "tend to be passive, that is to say, they are the ones who receive the actions carried out by the majority group in 78.78% of cases" (Martínez-Lirola & Olmos-Alcaraz, 2015, p.7). Martínez Lirola and Olmos Alcaraz (2015) have noted that 90.91% of migrant women and children were represented by assimilation, that is, represented as a collective or group, compared to 9.09% of the news in which they were represented individually.

In the case of television news referring to immigrant women and minors, most of them were negative, 70.83% of the corpus analyzed, and referred to "arrests for prostitution and shipwrecks or interceptions of boats with women and minors arriving to the Andalusian coasts" (Martínez-Lirola & Olmos-Alcaraz, 2015, p.9).

Martínez-Lirola (2017) specifically analysed the representation of sub-saharan immigrants. According to this author, immigrants were represented in a way that the negative aspects of them and the moments of the arrival were highlighted. The general tendency was to represent them as victims, distanced from the readers and as different from the local society. The sub-saharan migrants were portrayed as vulnerable, dependent as a people-problem, as people who are sick or in need.

However, it has also been pointed out that the influence of media is limited and it is necessary to consider the conditions of reception of these speeches. In the case of Spain, Iglesias Pascual (2014, 2017) has identified as factors influencing opinions on immigration "the media, the internal vision of residents or ex-residents in these neighbourhoods and, finally, occasional displacements" (Iglesias Pascual, 2017, p. 100).

3. Politicians' discourse on immigration: main debates and representations

Immigration as a topic of political debate in the European Union and Spain has been positioned since the mid-1990s. Tampere Programme in 1999, a common European immigration and asylum policy, can be considered a milestone of this era (García Juan, 2015). Various legislative reforms between 1996-2006 facilitated the formation of a political discourse on immigration differentiated between the Spanish parties with parliamentary representation (García Juan, 2015). In this period "immigration acquired an unusual prominence and was perceived as one of the issues on the political agenda of the institutions" (García Juan, 2015, p. 145).

According to Zapata-Barrero (2009) in the political discourse on immigration underlies a conflict between monoculturality and multiculturalism (Prieto-Andrés, 2017). From his point of view, there are two types of discourse: a) a monocultural one, which is called reactive because it reacts against the historical process. This discourse seeks to re-establish a past, manage the conflict and focuses on the negative alterations of interculturality. It

interprets migration as something negative and threatening, opposing citizens to immigrants; b) the one that leads to a multicultural future, which he calls proactive, which assumes the irreversibility of the process and seeks to shape it as a framework to orient social changes. This discourse represents immigration as an opportunity, appeals to the entire population, whether they are citizens or not, voters or not, and advocates respect for pluralism.

According to Prieto-Andrés (2017) analysis of six Spanish newspapers, *El país*, *El Mundo*, *ABC*, *Heraldo de Aragón*, *El Periódico de Aragón* and *La Vanguardia*, there is "an almost absolute equality between proactive and reactive discourses in all the media analysed, which manifests a global vision of the media, divided and contradictory, but it undoubtedly reflects the positions of the social actors present in the press and therefore of our society" (Prieto-Andrés, 2017, p. 702). He has also stated that mixed speeches, which mix different rhetoric, are scarce (10.5%) and states that the influence of the two main Spanish national political parties is demonstrated. When the Popular Party (PP) is the main source of the media content, a reactive discourse predominates, and if the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) is the main source, there is a balance between the two discourses (Prieto-Andrés, 2017).

Across the political spectrum, an argument was chosen based on the assumption of an irreversible migratory process leading to a multicultural future that represented a historical opportunity and a challenge for the future (García Juan, 2015). Prior to the economic crisis, as the researcher García Juan (2015) points out, an idea of social cohesion and non-discrimination prevailed, a respect for the principle of democratic equality -instead of placing the discourse around the idea of security, the interest of the State and national citizenship. "The political discourse was essentially unanimous in terms of the legal framework, focusing above all on what it was intended to achieve (integration and equal rights) and not on what it was intended to avoid (insecurity and instability)" (García Juan, 2015, p. 148).

Due to the institutionality and distribution of some political responsibilities in the matter of foreigners towards the autonomous communities, the discourses on immigration and migrants take diverse community nuances. In general, for Fernández-Suárez (2015), the development of regional governments at different speeds and the existence of different positions in defence of a self-identity mark to a great extent the creation of the discourse on immigrants' integration.

Fernández-Suárez (2015) states that in Catalonia, the Autonomous Community that receives one of the greatest flows and has the largest migrant population in Spain, a more plural and complex discourse is developed than in other Autonomous Communities. According to Fernández-Suárez (2015), this has allowed for a series of political debates around issues related to immigration: a) the municipal registry of immigrants in irregular administrative situation in the different municipalities, and administrative procedure that gives access to the use and enjoyment of Welfare State resources; b) access to social rights and resources of the Welfare State, where it was discussed whether to guarantee this right

for the foreign population with a residence permit or to maintain it for the migrant population as a whole, bearing in mind that the increase in the foreign population did not lead to an increase in investment in social policies; c) extension of political rights, for example, the granting of votes in local elections and the change in the requirements of legislation on access to Spanish nationality to make it more flexible; d) the prohibition of the burqa in public spaces; e) the vision of integration and its political philosophy; f) immigration and the use of the Catalan language.

According to Fernández-Suárez (2015) in the Community of Madrid, unlike Catalonia, the question of identity is resolved in a territorial identification that assumes the Spanish language as its own. Within this framework, political discourse focuses on "the demands imposed on foreigners to access social and political rights during their residence in Spain" (Fernández-Suárez, 2015, p. 56). The Popular Party of Madrid bases its discourse on the defence of the legacy of European societies and on the defence of the Catholic heritage, advocates a system of meritocratic integration in the discourse, in which foreigners strive to gain their space in the receiving society and must assume their decision to integrate. It also advocates a Spanish national identity and the devolution of responsibilities in matters of foreigners to the central government (Fernández-Suárez, 2015). On the other hand, the Socialist Workers Party in Madrid defines itself in the matter of immigration by defending positions such as the normalisation of access to public services, guaranteeing equal opportunities around a vision of interculturality (Fernández-Suárez, 2015). While United Left party defends a vision of intercultural integration, a proposal halfway between multiculturalism and assimilationism (Fernández-Suárez, 2015).

In Andalusia, According to Fernández-Suárez (2015), in the political discourse of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, the main concerns are the living conditions of irregular immigrants in agriculture, social integration and normalisation of access to social services. For the Popular Party, the issue of immigration does not play a central role, however, they raise the need to articulate an orderly migration and put an end to the arrival of irregular immigrants, emphasizing that foreigners should exercise their rights and duties as citizens. For Fernández-Suárez (2015) "at the local level the discourse on integration is openly assimilationist without excessive nuances, and in relation to equal opportunities there is a defense from a paternalistic view of immigrants residing in this region" (p. 62).

Castaño, Martínez, & Periañez (2017) have analysed the political discourse in the Comprehensive Plans for Immigration in Andalusia, according to this author "these policies, which are in harmony with the EU's agenda on immigration from outside its borders, have contributed to the reinforcement of an imaginary in which immigration is regarded as the cause of cultural fracture and division, a potential hazard for security, an instrument and a consequence of economic growth, and a phenomenon that needs controlling and regulating" (p. 69-70).

Mantecón, Membrado, & Huete (2016), have analyzed the political discourse in the province of Alicante, a province that implemented a policy of building real estate and attracting migrant buyers from high-income countries by offering housing. In their analysis

of interviews with local politicians they identify "four basic attitudes of politicians towards foreign residents: a) of arrivals as "heroes"; b) of gratitude towards arrivals; c) of "invisibility" of arrivals; d) of arrivals as a kind of "plague" (Mantecón, Membrado, & Huete, 2016, p.75).

Although in the period before and after the economic crisis immigration issues had not been positioned in the electoral debate, this situation changed in the last elections. Perhaps the high point is the emergence of an anti-immigration discourse, in a political scenario marked by polarisation, the territorial crisis, the increase in the arrival of immigrants through the Southern Border and the openly populist treatment.

For the first time in the history of democracy in Spain, a political party catalogued as far-right has parliamentary representation. In the last elections held on April 28, 2019, the political party VOX won 10.26% of the votes, breaking into Congress with 24 deputies. According to the analysis of Fundación porCausa (2019) this party develops a speech in which "they advocate the expulsion of all illegal immigrants, as well as those who have committed crimes, prioritizing the interests of Spanish citizens over migrants, in addition to building another wall at the borders of Ceuta and Melilla" (p. 40).

The president of this party also builds an Islamophobic discourse by proposing the closure of mosques and constructing a categorization of migrants according to cultural and linguistic proximity. In the words of Santiago Abascal, former member of the Popular Party and current president of VOX, "an immigrant from a brother country in Latin America, with the same culture, the same language, the same world view, is not the same as immigration from Islamic countries" (Sosa, 2018, April 17). The discourse of the VOX political party shows a strong rejection of multiculturalism, defending Spanish nationalist culture and the religious framework of Catholicism (Fundación porCausa, 2019).

Some recent cases of political discourse on health system reforms have also been analysed. García-González (2018) notes that the recent health reform has been based on xenophobic political discourse by equating "health tourism" and "irregular migration". These proclamations promoted the idea of health-driven migration and a representation of migrants as a threat to the stability of the health system.

4. Debate and conclusion

In this section, we present the main conclusions and debates based on this review related to our research questions. We organize this section into three parts: a) changes in public attitudes towards migration issues, b) representations of migrants and refugees and c) main debates on migration in the last five years.

Changes of public attitudes towards migration issues

According Cea D'Ancona (2015) in Spain, the increases in labour competition and social benefits led to an increase in perception of xenophobia, although this perception is still a minority one. The latest revised data show that a majority of respondents associate immigration with positive or very positive aspects for their own country.

Representations of migrants and refugees

In the Spanish media, there is a majority representation of immigrants as victims, de-citizens and frontier subjects, deprived of context. Some researchers argue that there is a political interest in constructing the narrative of the migrant as a problem and not as an equal status human or as a subject contributing to society.

There has also been a tendency to marginalize their voice as source in the journalistic story, despite being the protagonists of the news, "in this sense the media should offer more testimonies from people from other origins and countries, who could narrate in first person their migratory experiences, and not leave this work exclusively to police, civil guards, Red Cross volunteers and politicians" (Martínez-Lirola & Olmos-Alcaraz, 2015, p.14).

In the political discourse, on the one hand, immigrants are represented as an opportunity for economic development in their role as workers, and also as real estate consumers, in the case of migrants from high socioeconomic countries. On the other hand, they are also represented as a threat to religious beliefs and to the essential elements of national identity such as language and a potential problem for national security.

However, despite the fact that the reviewed research agrees that there is a negative representation of the migrant as a problem, the CIS perception data indicate that these discourses seem to have a minority influence, although not less important, on people's perception. At least, in the CIS 2017 survey directly negative considerations were minor: only 4.3% of those interviewed associated immigration with delinquency and insecurity, 3.1% with problems of integration and coexistence and 3.3% made generic references to immigration as a problem.

We noted the absence of an explicit pro-migration discourse in media, that is, a discourse that promotes migration as a normal human practice, permanent and mutually beneficial human process for humanity, especially in the media of the host societies. The absence of such a discourse leaves an open media space for the emergence of xenophobic and racist discourses.

Main debates on migration in the last five years

In terms of political discourse, the recent emergence in the Spanish political scene of what has been called the anti-immigration franchise (Fundación porCausa, 2019) currently

introduces the issue of immigration as an electoral weapon, which entails the use of discourse as a tool for activating fear to poor migrants, especially when migrants are perceived as very different from the cultural, economic or religious matrix of the host community.

In the context of current economic development and low birth rate, the discourse of orderly migration and the promotion of migration only of competent migrants would be drifting towards a hierarchy of migrant qualities, according to the economic, identity and religious interests of the discursive community.

The political discourse on immigration in Spain can be interpreted as a conflict between a monoculturalist and a multiculturalist representation (Prieto-Andrés, 2017). The two main political forces and the analyzed media are related to both reactive and proactive discourses.

In the case of Spain, the politics of the identity of the Autonomous Communities affect the political discourse and integration proposals in different ways. In this framework, the discourse on integration acquires community nuances and, according to the different Autonomous Community, they are in tension with other nationalist discourses. In the period under review, the access of migrants to various services offered by the state, the broadening of their political participation and their cultural expressions, especially with regard to Muslim religion and culture, have been discussed. There have also been discussions on living conditions in both urban and rural contexts linked to agriculture and on the tightening of access conditions for immigrants, including the increase of admission requirements up to the construction and reinforcement of borders.



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The data for this report are diverse and their type differs according to the specific topics addressed. For the first section, focusing on the main debates on migration, the report relies on two distinctive datasets: one which is concerned with an overview of public opinion on the topic of migration and another one focusing on actual evidence related to the economic and social impact of immigration. For an analysis of public opinion, the report relies on data provided by public bodies (The National Centre for Social Research), professional polling firms (Ipsos-MORI), academic research centres (The Migration Observatory at Oxford University) and individual researchers (Lord Ashcroft). Actual evidence regarding the impact of migration has been collated using data provided by research centres such as the Centre for Economic Performance at the London School of Economics and public bodies such as the Migration Advisory Committee.

The second section, which addresses the changes of public attitudes towards migration issues, has relied both on datasets produced by the aforementioned public bodies and professional polling firms, as well as on insights offered by other established academics and

public servants working on the topic of migration: Rob Ford (University of Manchester), Heather Rolfe (National Institute of Economic and Social Research) and Patrick English (University of Exeter).

Finally, for the section focusing on the representations of migrants and refugees, the evidence used has come from three main sources: academic research which has generated a great deal of media analyses over the last five years, international agencies such as the UN Refugee Agency, which has commissioned a comprehensive report on media portrayal of the refugee crisis across five European countries, and charities such as Migrant Voices which is working to strengthen the voice, participation and representation of migrants in the media and has also produced an excellent set of working practices for journalists.

1. Main debates on migration in the last five years

As of 2017, the UK accounted for the second largest numbers of foreign-born citizens living in the country of all European nations: 9.5 million, just behind Germany (13.7 million), but ahead of France (8.1 million), Italy (6.1 million) and Spain (6.1 million) (Eurostat 2019). Yet, the share of migrants within the total population of the country represents 14.4 percent, placing the UK only on the tenth place amongst fellow European countries.

Overall, it can be argued that the attitudes towards migration reflect this distribution. In the last 15 years, the people in the UK have expressed increasingly positive views to immigration (Robert Ford and Lympelopoulou 2017), especially in economic terms, as the UK is 7th out of 18 European countries, compared with 16th in 2002. By contrast, UK attitudes to immigration's cultural impact rank amongst the less positive in Europe (14th out of 18) (Robert Ford and Lympelopoulou 2017). Furthermore, the views on the economic impact of migration are unequally shared amongst the UK population, with the young degree-educated people almost twice more likely to have a positive outlook than those of older school-leavers (Robert Ford and Lympelopoulou 2017).

Despite the positive view on the economic contribution of migration to the country, the vast majority of debates surrounding immigration are still focusing on the economic aspects¹⁹. The remaining of this section will first start by highlighting how attitudes towards migration vary according to different socio-economic factors. Subsequently, it will describe the relevant debates, both economic and socio-cultural.

¹⁹ This focus can be explained by a general shortage of skilled workers across the UK: the majority of organisations in country (91%) struggled to find workers with the right skills in 2018 and have concomitantly spent more than £4.4 billion (€4.9) on recruitment fees, increased salaries, temporary staff and training to bring the skills of those hired at a lower level up to scratch (The Open University 2019).

1.1 Factors impacting public perceptions of migration

Overall, there is a poor and biased public understanding of impacts of migration in the UK. According to the National Institute of Economic and Social Research this perception is strongly influenced by the media and has, in turn, effects on the quality and content of public debate and the policy formulation process (Rolfe, Portes, and Hudson-Sharp 2016). Even a basic feature such as the size of immigrant population is distorted in the eyes of the general UK population: the public's average guess at what proportion the foreign-born population make up of the UK is 31%, compared with the official estimate of around 13% (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).

Having said that, the attitudes towards migration differ considerably according to socio-demographic characteristic. As a general observation, it must be noted that the public has more positive views about immigrants in the local areas than nationally, seeing them as a national political issue rather than a personal one. Across the UK, white Britons in areas with high ethnic diversity such as London and the bigger cities, but also in student towns, are least likely to want to reduce immigration; on the contrary, Northern manufacturing and industrial towns as well as areas with low migration levels are more keen to see levels of migration reduced (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).

Age, class and education levels equally play an important role in how perceptions of immigration are shaped. The report *Small island: Public opinion and the politics of immigration* by Lord Ashcroft (2013) suggests there are seven segments of opinion on immigration:

- 1) 'Universal Hostility' (16% of the population): they represent the most negative group as nine out of ten believe controlling immigration is one of the most important issues. They are most likely working class, middle-aged, and have low levels of education;
- 2) 'Cultural Concerns' (16%): the segment is comprised of older people, many of whom are owner-occupiers. They are concerned about cultural changes in their local area and/or in society, as well as the pressure of immigration on public services. Immigration is a very important issue for them, with two thirds naming it as one of the top three facing the country;
- 3) 'Competing for Jobs' (14%): while being no less likely than the 'Cultural Concerns' public to consider that the disadvantages of immigration outweigh the advantages overall, this group is most concerned about the impact on jobs and wages. Although they acknowledge that immigrants often work hard for low pay, they are more likely to think immigrants take jobs that would otherwise go to British people while pushing down wages;
- 4) 'Fighting for Entitlements' (12%): they are predominantly concerned about immigrants competing for public services and benefits, which they think they often

receive at the expense of established residents. The group is older than average with relatively low levels of formal education;

5) 'Comfortable pragmatists' (22%): Largely represented by graduates and professionals; they show little concern about immigration and have a balanced view, believing immigration has put pressure on the economy and public services, but that it has also enriched the country and society;

6) 'Urban Harmony' (9%): Predominantly young and based in urban centres, this group is the most ethnically diverse. While recognising the cultural and economic benefits of immigration, this group has mixed views on immigration. Being concentrated in urban centres they are more likely than average to have seen and felt the impact of immigration on competition for work, wages, access to housing or other public services and the character of the local area.

7) 'Militantly Multicultural' (10%): Dominated by graduates and professionals, with the greatest concentration of public sector employees, this group is overwhelmingly positive about nearly every aspect of immigration. They value the economic and cultural contribution of immigrants and are twice as likely as average to employ immigrants to clean or do building jobs. For this group, immigration comes at the very bottom of their list of concerns for the country and believe that a dramatic reduction in the level of immigration would harm the economy.

Public attitudes to immigration do not differ substantially across historical regions of the UK. Reflecting the experience of a country whose share of the UK population declined during the course of the twentieth century, and whose population is expected to age even more rapidly than that of the UK as a whole, Scotland has sought to encourage people from elsewhere to come to Scotland to live and work. Yet, this is not necessarily reflected in visibly different attitudes from those held in England and Wales: Scotland may have voted differently in an EU referendum in which immigration was a key issue and it may have a devolved government that is much more positive about immigration, but that does not mean that the balance of public opinion about the consequences of immigration is markedly more positive here (Curtice and Montagu 2018).

There are notable differences to how migrants are perceived based on their country of origin. Generally, at the preferred end of the scale are the immigrants who are white, English-speaking, Europeans and Christian countries (such as France, Australia, Poland) while at the least favoured are non-whites, non-Europeans and Muslim countries (such as Pakistan, Nigeria and, interestingly, Romania) (Blinder and Richards 2018). Religion equally plays an important role in how certain migrants are seen by the public. Despite the fact that a third of the UK population is associating national identity with being a Christian, nearly nine-in-ten respondents in the UK (88%; same as European average) would accept Jews as neighbors, which is 10 percentage points higher than the share who say they would accept Muslims as neighbors (78%; lower than the EU average, 83%) (Pew Research Center 2018).

1.2 Economic and socio-cultural debates on immigration

The economic dimension of most debates related to immigration in the UK is best illustrated through the famed anecdote about the 'Schrödinger's immigrant' whereby immigrants exist in a state of both lazing around on benefits whilst simultaneously being out there stealing British jobs. While there is no clear evidence showing that migration has an overall negative impact on jobs, housing or the crowding out of public services, and while the negative impact on wages of less skilled groups are small, it seems indeed that the largest impacts of immigration is, in fact, on public perceptions (Wadsworth 2015).

The debates on immigration since 2014 can be grouped into six main themes: 1) jobs and the labour market impacts; 2) fiscal and resource impacts and 3) community and cultural impacts.

Jobs and the Labour Market Impacts

The UK research suggests the impact of immigration on average wages and employment is small, with evidence, however, for more significant effects along the wage distribution (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). In relation to the European Economic Area migrants to the UK, there is also little evidence of substantial impact on the overall employment opportunities and aggregate wages of UK-born workers (Migration Advisory Committee 2018). Overall, statistics show that immigrants are better educated and younger than their UK-born counterparts, especially those from the EU15 (the members before the 2004 EU enlargement). They are also over-represented in the very high-skilled and very low-skilled occupations (Wadsworth 2015).

Despite this evidence, perceptions of overall economic impact of migration are generally negative: between 2006-2011, around 40% of the British public have consistently felt immigration is bad for the economy overall, with typically a slightly smaller proportion thinking that immigration is good for the economy (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). Economically vulnerable groups have tended to be more negative in their assessment of the economic impact of immigration compared with people from professional occupations and with higher reported income (Robert Ford, Morrell, and Heath 2012). On the other hand, perceptions of immigration's impact on the labour market and jobs are more clearly negative than most of these overall economic assessments: for six in ten Britons immigration has a negative impact on the labour market for the native population. Despite these concerns, skills remain nevertheless a valuable asset in the job market, irrespective of status: the percentage of the population thinking that jobs should necessarily go to British workers is relatively equal to the percentage insisting that British companies should prioritise jobs to the people with the best qualifications and skills (45% and 47% respectively) (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).

Fiscal and Resource Impacts

As a general observation, the age profile of migrants makes it more likely that they will be net fiscal contributors to public finances: since migrants tend to arrive at working age, the UK avoids the cost of paying for their education (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). Immigrants are, in general, net fiscal contributors to the UK economy, yet, as with the previous category, most of the public do not hold that view. While there is evidence that the prices of some personal services have been reduced by migration, particularly in relation to New Member States and non-European Economic Area migration, there is also evidence that migration has increased house prices. At the same time, European Economic Area migrants pay more in taxes than they receive in benefits and they also contribute much more to the health service and the provision of social care in financial resources and work than they consume in services (Migration Advisory Committee 2018). Similarly, there is little evidence or agreement on the impact of migration on state education, but the impact seems to be low overall, while foreign-born individuals have similar levels of social rented tenure as UK-born individuals (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).

Yet, despite such evidence, a negative attitude towards migrants' access to welfare, public and social services and social housing is prevalent across the UK. Such attitudes must nevertheless be put into a broader UK context since in recent years very widespread negative views have been expressed of the national welfare system. Thus, the public's perception of immigrants' relationship with welfare is driven by the general belief that immigrants receive more than they pay in, and get unfair priority on many aspects of state support (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). Amongst the most common concerns and statements expressed in polls of public attitude to migration are that 'immigrants [are] claiming benefits and using public services when they've contributed nothing in return' (Lord Ashcroft 2013) and that 'migrants should not have full access to benefits until they become citizens' (Ipsos MORI 2009). A broader impact of migration on public services is also visible: the abuse of / burden on public services is one of the top concerns recurring in opinion polls conducted in several recent years (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). Finally, echoing the ongoing housing crisis in the UK, the public opinion feels more strongly that immigration has had a negative impact on the availability of housing (69% negative) than schools or the NHS (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014).

Community and Cultural Impacts

In contrast to their views on the economic impact, people in the UK are on average less positive about the cultural impact of migrant than most of their European counterparts (except for France and Austria, which both have very large and electorally successful radical right-wing parties) (Ford and Lymeropoulou 2017). Overall assessments of the cultural impact of immigration in the UK shows an even split, with equal proportions of the population saying it has been good and bad for the British culture (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). In relation to community cohesion, it has been concluded that immigration at the local level has either no or a small positive impact on individuals' life satisfaction (Giulietti and Yan 2018)

and that there is no evidence that migration has affected crime (Migration Advisory Committee 2018).

In relation to schools in particular, the migration debates revolve around integration, either through the provision of English classes and the issue of wearing traditional dress in school. There is an overall public support for additional classes in English language for children with immigrant background, with over seventy percent of all generations supporting it. On the other hand, there is more lack of public understanding to wearing traditional dress, with a fairly obvious decline in support for traditional dress, from around half (48%) to a third (33%) between 1983 and 2010, when the latest data on the topic have been published (Ipsos MORI 2010).

1.3 Solutions to the 'migration problem'

The migration related policies presented by the three main national UK parties (Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats) in their manifestos for the 2017 general election focus on six main themes: Net Migration; Rights for EU Nationals living in the UK; Work migration policies; Study migration policies; Family migration policies; Asylum policies.

The three manifestos show two different approaches to migration policy, according to an analysis presented by the Migration Observatory:

On one hand, the Conservative approach – which is underpinned by a commitment to reducing net migration to the tens of thousands. Policies such as increasing charges for access to the NHS, increasing the levy on employers taking on migrant workers and increasing the income required to sponsor a family member have the potential to reduce immigration and net-migration, but they seem unlikely to deliver net migration in the “tens of thousands” on their own. Of course, there is an expectation that Brexit will reduce EU migration, but it is unclear by how much at the moment. On the other hand, while the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats have been critical of the net migration target, neither has managed to cut through with a policy that will address public support for less immigration. Also, both parties have proposed to take international students out of the immigration statistics, but the potential advantages of this practice are less clear in the absence of a clear numerical target on migration (Migration Observatory 2017, 4–5).

More recently, the Conservative government's plans for migration have become more clear, particularly after Brexit, following the publication in December 2018 of the White Paper 'The UK's future skills-based immigration system', which outlines post-Brexit migration policy plans. The document delineates a greater focus on skills, while scrapping the cap on inflows of skilled migrants combined with tighter controls on unskilled migrants. Also, a single system of migration control will apply to migrants from within and outside the EU. Furthermore, there is no mention of the government's target to reduce net migration to 'tens of thousands' a year,

a suggestion that the longstanding and contentious policy could have been shelved (Rob Ford 2019).

1.4 Conclusions

Despite the overall positive economic and cultural impacts of migration, the issue remains a thorny one in the eyes of the British public. Immigration was certainly a main driver pushing for Brexit and public concerns centre on negative impacts on jobs, wages and public services are regularly expressed in opinion polls. Immigration attitudes are deeply embedded, resistant to change, as immigration is framed as a problem, sometimes a threat and something that politicians should be dealing with (Rolfe 2018).

Also, as previously indicated, these perceptions are often badly wrong and systematically biased towards immigrant types of greater concern (asylum seekers versus students) (Duffy and Frere-Smith 2014). Moreover, survey questions rarely define what is meant by 'immigrants', allowing each respondent to offer an answer based on their own unstated conception of who the immigrants are. Question wording matters in equal measure: when people are asked, for example, if immigration ought to be reduced, the responses will always tend to be more negative. A more positive outlook becomes evident, on the other hand, when questions focus on whether people feel that immigration makes their country a better or worse place. A holistic approach to analysing survey results is always better than relying on a limited number of survey questions.

2. Changes of Public Attitudes towards Migration Issues

The most recent evidence plainly shows that levels of objection to immigration in the UK is relatively high. A majority of 58% of the population is in favour of reducing the number of immigrants either by 'a lot' or 'a little', with a further 30% preferring the number of immigrants to stay about the same and 13% being in favour of an increase (Blinder and Richards 2018).

2.1 Historical evolution

Opposition to migration is not new, nevertheless, and the public resistance fluctuated between 86% and 32% (depending also, to an extent, on the variety of available data sources and the changes to question wording over the years) ever since the 1964, when the British Election Study first began asking the public about immigration (Blinder and Richards 2018).

In the last five years, which is the period that this report is concerned with, a softening of attitudes can be observed. While the level allowing only 'a few' or 'none' was consistently

floating at between 60% and 50% in 2013 and 2014, it had dropped to below 40% in 2017 and 2018 (Figure 1). This evolution can partly be linked to a public response to the hostile environment in the country: 'After the success of the BNP and the rise of UKIP, David Cameron's 2011 declaration of the 'failure of multiculturalism' and his 'war' on its proponents and policies, and a very public 'battle' between those in favour of immigration and those against it in mainstream politics, it appears that pro-immigrant sentiments grew in response' (English 2019, para. 12).




Figure 1: Quarterly public opinion on immigration in Great Britain (%) (Source: English 2019)

2.2 Immigration, one of the 'most important issues' facing the British public (after Brexit)

A different way to gauge public opinion on the issue of immigration is by relying on people to spell out the 'most important issue(s)' facing their country. Rather than directly measuring people's attitudes toward immigration, this second approach leaves the respondents decide what are for them the most salient reasons of concern. Ever since mid-2014, immigration was consistently named as the most salient issue facing the country, peaking at 56% in September 2015. After the EU Referendum in June 2016, immigration has been mentioned by far fewer people, falling from 48% in June 2016 to 21% in December 2017, to a lowest of 16% in December 2018. (Ipsos MORI 2019; Figure 2). Understandably, Europe and EU have increased in salience, alongside the National Health Service (NHS).

WHAT DO YOU SEE AS THE MOST/OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING BRITAIN TODAY?




Figure 2: The percentage of respondents naming race relations or immigration as one of the most important issues facing Britain (Source: Ipsos MORI 2019)

Interestingly, the concern with leaving the EU does not necessarily translate into the public believing that levels of immigration will decrease as a consequence. As much as 37% of the population thinks that leaving the EU will not make much difference to the level of immigration into Britain, a percent which is actually slightly higher than the 31% who expressed that view in 2015 (Curtice and Montagu 2019).

2.3 Conclusions

There are good reasons to think migration will be a less divisive issue after Brexit, at least initially as 'concern about the issue has sharply declined, British voters have become more aware of the benefits migration brings, and the government's proposed post-Brexit approach to the issue is a better fit with the priorities voters express' (Rob Ford 2019).

At the same time, the rise and fall in anti-immigrant sentiment indicate the existence of what Patrick English calls a 'thermostatic' character to British public opinion, whereby 'aggregate public opinion is responding to movements and changes in policies, discourses, and mobilisation regarding immigration' (English 2019, para. 9). Thus, while it is difficult to anticipate how the public attitudes regarding immigration will change in the future, a close attention to the broader national mood is essential. The last section of this report will deal with how this mood is shaped through media representations of migrants and refugees.

3. Representations of migrants and refugees

British media representations of migrants and refugees in the last five years must be understood in the context of both a longstanding tradition of right-wing press in the country. British people are the most likely to say their press is right wing out of seven European countries - and the most likely to say the press is too negative and biased in its coverage of

immigration (Dahlgreen 2016). Moreover, a broader nationalism is apparent across the media landscape in the UK. The wide use of national symbols and national denotations in the British media is striking as anything can take the label 'Great Britain', argues Griseldis Kirsch:

For example, *The Great British Bake-Off*, a programme in which hobby bakers compete for the title as the best hobby baker, *Great British Menu*, in which professional chefs have to design a menu for a dinner at a special occasion, or, more recently, *Great British Garden Revival*, *Great British Railway Journeys*, to name but few of the BBCs programmes, which are complemented by Rory Bremner's *Great British Views* on the private station ITV, respectively *A Great British Christmas* on another private station, Channel 4. Often, the logos of these shows will feature a union flag somewhere. While this could be seen as a branding exercise, maybe harking back to the days of 'Cool Britannia' under Tony Blair's leadership, it also creates the feeling of an 'imagined community' – the 'Great British people' taking part in a common activity (Kirsch 2016, 113; highlight in original).

This section highlights the most prevalent media representations of migrants and is structured in three parts. First, it presents a brief timeline of events in the last five years that have directly influenced British media's approached to the 'migration issue'. Since 2014, four milestones can be detected: the European Elections in 2014; the end of limitations on Freedom of Movement for Bulgarians and Romanians in 2014; the 'refugee crisis' of 2015-2016; the General Election of 2015, followed by the European Union membership referendum the next year. Second, the section demonstrates how the migrant issue is overwhelmingly framed as a problem by the British press and, more specifically, as a 'crisis of borders', while arguing that media *does* shape how migration is perceived by the British public. Finally, the section concludes by insisting on the actual language being deployed in the media, with migrants most often seen through 'threat' or 'villain' frames. While Bulgarians and Romanians in particular have been subjects to the most negative stereotypes, it appears that overall the British media has one of the most vicious attitudes in Europe when dealing with migration.

3.1 Media mirroring the 'crisis': a timeline

The rise in media coverage of migration has started in 2010 and coincides with the election of the Conservative-led coalition government and the introduction of measures to reduce net migration in 2011 and 2012. It can be observed that the volume of press coverage mentioning 'immigration' or 'migration' declined from 2006 to 2011 before rising each year from 2011 to mid-2015. The average month in 2014 contained over twice as many articles mentioning immigration than in 2011 (Migration Observatory 2016). The debates leading to the European Parliament elections in 2014 further exacerbated the negative tone in the media: 'anti-immigrant rhetoric proffered by politicians and propagated by the media has contributed to a general climate of hostility that sanctions the moralising, differentiation of (if not actual discrimination against) East Europeans' (Fox, Moroşanu, and Szilassy 2015, 730).

The same year, 2014, marked another event that further sparked negative reactions in the media: the lifting of remaining work restrictions for Romanians and Bulgarians. The arrival on the 1st of January 2014 of Victor Spirescu, the first Romanian to land in the UK under the new legislation, was met by a pack of both journalists and politicians at Luton airport in London, demanding to know whether he was coming to the UK in search of benefits (Davies and Malik 2014). Overall, there was a sudden increase in the frequency of discussion of migrants from the EU/Europe which started in 2013, with a particular spike in 2014 when Romanians and Bulgarias achieved full access to the local labour market (Migration Observatory 2016).

In the following two years, the media and public attention switched to the refugee crisis and refugee camp in Calais. A notable change in depictions of refugees between 2006 and 2015 was already apparent, but the more recent events coincided as well with a sharp increase in references to Syrians: 'Refugees tend to be described in terms of their geographic origins more than immigrants: since 2012, the press mentioned Syrian refugees the most. Prior to that point, 'Palestinian' was the most frequent modifier of 'refugees''. (Migration Observatory 2016, para. 38). The intense media focus on the refugees has produced distortions by assimilating them into one single category, 'migrant', thus blurring the boundaries between the various groups of people even further: 'While (...) the term migrant is politically neutral and simply means someone migrating (...), this hiding behind a technical term (...) also has the flipside of category conflation and 'blanket Othering' of diverse groups of people with completely different aims and purposes – and thus a real debate about the various forms of migration is prevented' (Kirsch 2016, 116). Not all media outlets have deployed nevertheless the same encompassing term to describe very different realities: while broadsheets newspapers opted for the term 'refugees', UK tabloids primarily referenced to them as 'immigrants' or 'migrants', 'hinting towards a deliberate use of the terms 'migrant/immigrant' to delegitimize the refugees' or asylum seekers' dire political and personal circumstances' (Eberl et al. 2018, 210).

Finally, the General Election of 2015 and the European Union membership referendum in 2016 brought the immigration issue to media attention in different ways. Immigration, a policy area that might have been more problematic for the Conservatives (since it was already a topic favoured by UKIP), received little journalistic attention (Wring and Ward 2015). On the other hand, the Brexit vote clearly indicated how discourses on immigration had shifted from the periphery to the centre of the debate around Britain's membership in the European Union and effectively formed a large part of the arguments of the various political campaigns to leave the Union (Kirsch 2016).

Overall, it can be argued that in the last five years, and even from the beginning of the decade, there has been a shift from discussions concerning the migrants' legal status to the scale the phenomenon. When British newspapers have chosen to describe immigration over the 2006-2015 period, about 15% of the time they explicitly use the word 'mass'. This is closely followed by 'net' and 'illegal'. Similarly, the overall frequency in the media of limiting verbs such as 'limit' immigration or 'control' immigration increased by about four times between 2006. When the press explicitly assigned an adjective to immigrants and migrants during this period, the word 'illegal' was used 3 out of 10 times (Migration Observatory 2016).

3.2 Framing migration as a problem

It must be stated that the manner in which most media outlets describe migration is not only biased and distorted, but, most importantly, it arguably has a strong impact on public perception. Using a controlled survey experiment, Blinder and Jeannet (2018) show that language actually used in the British news media can have a causal effect on perceptions of immigrants: when British people encounter descriptions of immigrants presented as highly skilled or as Eastern European, their perceptions shift away from 'illegal' immigrants and asylum seekers, which represent two of the most notable subgroups of immigrants in British perceptions.

Examining the decade between 2006 and 2016, Migration Observatory notices a trend that is hardly surprising: in most of the situations migration is a problem to be addressed, rather than achievements. Media coverage of EU immigration tends to highlight the numbers of migrants, while articles dealing with illegal immigration insist on ineffective laws and increased criminality. 7 in 10 articles mentioning EU immigration, and about three-quarters of articles in the illegal immigration sample, contained only mentions of problems (Migration Observatory 2016).

The depiction of a Fortress Britain becomes apparent in the analysis done by Migration Observatory as both in the case of EU immigration and illegal immigration, problems and successes were most often justified on the grounds that the UK's own prosperity and well-being should be prioritised before others. A similar observation is made by Lesley Pruitt (2019) who notices that the dominant discourse in UK media during 2015-2016 constructed the increase in movements of people and applications for asylum as a 'crisis of borders'. After having reviewed ten media outlets (The Times, The Independent, The Telegraph, The Guardian, Daily Mail, Financial Times, The Sun, express.co.uk, Press Association, and The Daily Express), she argues that 'Europe's borders were deemed problematically porous in enabling large numbers of people to enter. This porosity was painted as leading to an ongoing crisis for people in Europe, with the assumption being that allowing more people to enter would threaten European borders, security forces, people, and identity' (2019: 1). The corollary of such a narrative is a marginalisation of dangers and insecurities that refugees and asylum seekers experienced and their consequent portrayal not as people seeking freedom from violence, but rather as perpetrators of crisis.


A similar conclusion is reached by Carolina Silveira who compared two publications with different ideologies: The Guardian and the Daily Mail. After examining two news articles published in July/June 2015 by the two newspapers, she concluded that both articles contribute to a similar discourse, 'which places the refugee at a distance and presents the UK as being threatened by a rising number of, specifically male, 'migrants'' (Silveira 2016, 1).

3.3 'Rivers of blood' 2.0

The specific language used by the tabloid press in 2014, during the period when Romanians and Bulgarians were allowed access to the British job market, is rather evocative of the Fortress Britain previously mentioned. The language deployed at the time to describe Romanians was often focused on crime and anti-social behavior (*gang, criminal, beggar, thief, squatter*), while the verbs used to discuss both Romanians and Bulgarians, across broadsheets and tabloids, were linked to travel (*come, arrive, move, travel, head*) and in tabloids these included metaphors related to scale (*flood, flock*) (Migration Observatory 2014).

The British online space has proved even more vicious than the tabloid media, with weblogs and discussion fora making effective use of dehumanizing metaphors, and parasite metaphors in particular, to characterise immigration in the UK. Depictions of immigrants as *parasites, leeches, or bloodsuckers* were a common sight in the period 2010-2013, according to research done by Andreas Musolf (2015). More recent investigation, focusing on the period before the General Election of 2015, has revealed that nearly half (46%) of all media articles under scrutiny framed migration as a threat and migrants as actual or potential 'villains'. A further 38% of the articles presented migrants as victims, while only 10% of articles framed migration and migrants as a benefit, principally to the economy (Crawley, McMahon, and Jones 2016).

This particular cruel attitude towards migrants expressed by the British press is confirmed when comparisons are made with media representations from across Europe. An examination of newspaper articles from 2014 to early 2015 across five European countries (Italy, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) shows that the UK press was among the most likely to cite economic pull factors and frame the crisis around border control issues: 'In most countries, newspapers, whether left or right wing, tended to report using the same sources. They also featured the same kinds of themes and provided similar explanations and solutions to the crisis. But the British press was different. (...) [T]he right-wing press consistently endorsed a hardline anti-refugee and migrant, Fortress Europe approach' (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, and Moore 2015, 10). A similar, but more recent report (Pierigh 2017, Figure 3) shows that from seven European countries (the UK, Greece, Italy, Norway, Serbia, Spain and Sweden), the UK press featured the highest number of negative articles towards migrants: almost half (46%) of the articles are seen as promoting negative stereotypes.






Figure 3: News stories promoting negative stereotypes against refugees/migrants.

4. Debate and Conclusions

To end on a positive note:

Noting that the voices and experiences of migrants in the UK were quoted in only 12% of news items sampled between January and April 2014, Migrant Voices, a migrant-led charity working to strengthen the voice, participation and representation of migrants in the media, has produced a set of working practices for journalists (Nelson et al. 2014). They seem a good starting point to achieve a more balanced representation of migrants in the UK media:

Attribution, as in all reporting, is vital. If you refer to the 'problem of irrigation', you are making it a fact. If you report a person as saying that immigration is a problem, it's their opinion.

Stereotypes and generalisations are lazy, dangerous and inaccurate – because even if some people fit the generalisation, many don't. What's a 'typical English person' – a Christian or an atheist? A sharp-suited businessman or a football hooligan? Or is she a woman?

Identifying someone as, for example, a Muslim or Christian rather than a Briton or a Tunisian – or, for that matter, a teacher– is to tell readers, listeners and viewers that the label you have chosen is of over riding importance in assessing their actions and views.

Beware the use of "we" or statements about the "national interest" (which usually means the interest of the party in power). Who are "we"? Who is excluded?

Make sure you understand – and correctly use – the meaning of all terms used: is an asylum-seeker a refugee? Should a story about jobs and migrants include statistics for people fleeing their countries because of fear of persecution? Is an asylum-seeker an immigrant who is in the country illegally? What is 'leave to remain'?

If you report someone's ethnicity, colour or religion in a news story aren't you, deliberately or accidentally, linking a particular look or affiliation to a behaviour or perhaps a crime?

Photos, captions, headlines, cartoons and presentations can tell their own story: one new Editor of a Midlands newspaper was told: "Your paper has lots of black faces – they are all on the Crimestoppers page" (Nelson et al. 2014, 30).



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